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Abstract 
Conflicts are a prevalent phenomenon in Africa. Of major wars after the Second 
World War, many occurred on the African continent. Families go to bed not sure of 
seeing one another on the following day. Conflicts and the lack of peace in Africa 
have been correctly identified as a major obstacle on the emancipation path that the 
African masses tread from poverty, underdevelopment and much want. Africa thus 
needs to take conflict resolution and the maintenance of peace on the continent 
seriously. 
One cannot, in any way, attempt to solve something that one does not understand. 
Research is, thus, important in the search for a peaceful Africa. In expression of such 
sentiments, the current study was undertaken to gain an understanding of 
peacemaking in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. The 
study seeks to make a comparative analysis of Namibia’s peacemaking role in this 
region. Such was wanting or minimal in the literature on Namibia. The study 
considered two case studies, those of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
Angola.   
The study found that Namibia is not only an active participant in SADC 
peacemaking, but it has contributed to the return of peace and stability in the region; 
the country played an important role in peacemaking in both the DRC and Angola. 
It found various similarities and differences between the two case studies. It was 
established that Namibia takes a twofold approach to peacemaking for it engaged in 
both diplomatic and military actions. Additionally, the study found that Namibia’s 
peacemaking role, in the cases considered, was conducted in a secretive manner.  
This is to say that the approach was somewhat secretive albeit becoming public 
knowledge later. While all cases are regarded as successful in terms of objectives vis-
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à-vis results analysis, the study found that the Angolan peacemaking was more 
successful than the DRC.   
This comparative analysis is, therefore, presented for those seeking to understand 
Namibia’s peacemaking in the region and also as a basis for future studies.  
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Opsomming 
Konflik is ŉ algemene verskynsel in Afrika. Van die grootste oorloë sedert die 
Tweede Wêreldoorlog het op die Afrikavasteland plaasgevind. Gesinne gaan saans 
bed toe sonder om te weet of hulle mekaar die volgende dag sal sien. Konflik en die 
gebrek aan vrede in Afrika word met reg bestempel as ŉ groot struikelblok vir die 
Afrikamassas se bevryding van armoede, onderontwikkeling en uiterste gebrek. 
Afrika behoort dus erns te maak met konflikbeslegting en die handhawing van 
vrede op die vasteland. 
Tog kan ŉ mens nie eintlik iets probeer oplos indien jy dit nie volkome begryp nie. 
Navorsing is dus belangrik in die strewe na ŉ vreedsame Afrika. Hierdie studie is 
derhalwe onderneem om ŉ begrip te bied van vredestigting in die Suider-Afrikaanse 
Ontwikkelingsgemeenskap- (SAOG-)streek. Meer bepaald bied die ondersoek ŉ 
vergelykende uiteensetting van Namibië se rol in vredestigting in die SAOG-streek – 
ŉ onderwerp waaroor daar tot dusver weinig, indien enigiets, in literatuur oor 
Namibië te vinde was. Die studie ondersoek twee gevallestudies, naamlik die 
Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo (DRK) en Angola. 
Die navorsing bevind dat Namibië nie net ŉ aktiewe deelnemer aan SAOG-
vredestigting is nie, maar ook tot die herstel van vrede en stabiliteit in die streek 
bygedra het; die land het ŉ belangrike rol in konflikbeslegting in sowel die DRK as 
Angola gespeel. Verskeie ooreenkomste en verkille tussen die twee gevallestudies 
het uit die navorsing na vore gekom. Dit blyk dat Namibië ’n tweeledige benadering 
tot vredestigting volg: Die land onderneem diplomatieke sowel as militêre optrede. 
Verder het die studie bevind dat Namibië sy rol as konflikbeslegter in die twee 
gevalle wat ondersoek is op ’n skugter manier vervul het. Dit is om te sê dat die 
benadering was ietwat geheimsinnig al is dit besig om openbare kennis later. 
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Hoewel alle gevalle as geslaagd beskou kan word aan die hand van die oogmerke en 
die uiteindelike uitkomste, het die studie bevind dat vredestigting in Angola 
geslaagder was as in die DRK. 
Hierdie vergelykende uiteensetting word dus aangebied vir diegene wat Namibië se 
benadering tot vredestigting in die streek wil verstaan, en dien terselfdertyd as 
grondslag vir toekomstige studies.  
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Timeline of the important events with regards to the DRC case study  
 
Date Event 
1884/5 Berlin Conference takes place; the DRC becomes a 
personal colony of King Leopold II. 
1908 Belgian Government takes over, from Kind 
Leopold II, the Administration of the Congo. 
January 1960 Belgium abruptly announced the granting of 
independence to the Congo. 
30 June 1960 The Congo becomes independent with Patrice 
Lumumba as Prime Minister. 
24 November 1965 With Lumumba overthrown, Colonel Joseph 
Desire Mobutu comes to power via a coup d’état.  
1994 Rwandan genocide takes place; the perpetrators 
flee into eastern Zaire.   
17 May 1997 Colonel Mobutu is overthrown by Laurent Kabila 
assisted by Rwanda and Uganda. Kabila renames 
the country, from Zaire, to Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC). 
1998 President Kabila orders the Rwandan and 
Ugandan forces and personnel to leave the 
country. 
 
Revolts and army mutiny occurs especially in 
eastern DRC. Various rebel groups are formed, to 
overthrow Kabila, with the support of Rwanda 
and Uganda. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
XIV 
 
 
Rebel forces and their allies begin occupying 
various provinces and started heading towards 
Kinshasa. 
August 1998 President Kabila appealed to SADC for assistance. 
 
SADC OPDS meeting on the DRC conflict takes 
place; establishes the verification committee to 
study the conflict and provide recommendations. 
 
Acting on recommendation of the verification 
committee; Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe send 
troops to assist President Kabila. 
 
Namibia provides a loan of N$ 25 Million and 20 
tons of military supplies to the DRC.  
 
13-14 September 1998 SADC Annual Summit takes place in Grand Baie, 
Mauritius. 
Preceded by major rift between SADC Chair, 
President Mandela and SADC  OPDS Chair, 
President Mugabe on the intervention;  SADC 
supports Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe’s 
intervention in the DRC. 
09 April 1999 Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe sign a mutual 
defence pact. 
10 July 1999 The Lusaka peace agreement is signed between all 
parties to the conflict. 
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February 2000 UN deploys troops under MONUC to oversee the 
Lusaka peace agreement. 
 
Namibia fully withdraws her troops. 
17 January 2001 President Kabila is assassinated, his son Joseph 
Kabila assumes the Presidency. 
January  2001 – onwards The Inter-Congolese Dialogue begins to take place.  
16 April 2001 UN panel of experts publishes its report on the 
illegal exploitation of the resources of the DRC. 
Foreign countries on both sides are found guilty. 
17 December 2002 The Global and All-Inclusive Agreement is signed. 
  
 
Timeline of the important events with regards to the Angolan case study  
 
Date Event 
1483 First Portuguese explorers arrive in 
Angola. 
1575 Paulo Dias de Novais erects a colonial 
settlement in Luanda. 
1961 The launch of the armed anti-colonial 
struggle. 
1974 A coup occurs in Portugal. The new 
Portuguese regime abruptly announces 
the granting of independence to Angola. 
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January  1975 The Alvor Accord is signed between 
Portugal, the MPLA, FANLA and 
UNITA. 
Fighting for state control between the 
nationalist movements emerged. 
August 1975 UNITA occupies southern Angola with 
the help of South Africa and the backing 
of the US. 
The Zairean Army of Mobutu invades 
northern Angola in support of FNLA. 
October 1975  Cuba sends troops to Angola in support 
of the MPLA. 
11 November 1975 Angolan Independence day. 
MPLA, having secured the capital, 
Luanda, proclaimed the ‘people’s 
republic.’ Agostinho Neto becomes 
President.  
1976 US support to UNITA halts with the 
passage of the Clark Amendment. 
South Africa withdrew its forces into 
northern Namibia. 
July 1985 Clark Amendment is repealed; the US 
resumed its support to UNITA.  
Cuba thus maintained about 50 000 
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ground troops in Angola to support the 
MPLA government. 
May 1991 UNITA and MPLA sign the Bicesse peace 
agreement. 
UNAVEM II is established. 
September 1992 First elections are held, won by MPLA, 
and UNITA refuses to accept the results 
thus going back to war. 
21 November 1994 UNITA and MPLA sign the Lusaka 
protocol. 
UN establishes UNAVEM III to oversee 
the protocol. 
Savimbi flouts the Lusaka protocol, goes 
back to war. 
1996 Namibia forms part of UNAVEM III. 
March 1997 Namibia sends a force, to Angola, to 
serve first in UN road verification and 
VIP escort and later as Rapid Reaction 
Force. 
1999 NDF integrated its operational plans, in 
fighting UNITA, with FAA. 
NDF is deployed between Angola-
Namibia borders. 
Namibia grants permission to FAA to 
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come fight UNITA rebels inside Namibia 
and also to launch attacks from inside 
Namibia. 
09 April 1999  Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe sign a 
mutual defence pact. 
December 1999 MPLA congress takes place, president 
Dos Santos calls for the UN to withdraw 
its troops. 
He suspends the Lusaka peace process 
on Angola and directs the FAA to launch 
an onslaught against UNITA. 
NDF Chief of Staff, Major-General 
Martin Shalli acknowledges the NDF 
presence inside Angola fighting UNITA. 
22 February 2002 Jonas Savimbi is assassinated.  
4 April 2002 Surviving UNITA military leaders sign a 
peace agreement with the MPLA 
government. 
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1 
CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1     Background and orientation  
Is peacemaking a subject of international relations (IR) or of political science? It features, 
at length, in the literature of both political science and IR. Be that as it may, this study 
engages not in wasteful epistemological or ontological debates between the two. The 
above merely acknowledges the existence of such a debate in the field. Brown and 
Ainley (2005:2), in discussing this debate, correctly conclude that there is hardly an area 
of social science where there is universal consensus that can be relied upon for a field 
definition. They further caution that: 
… conventional definitions in most of the social sciences tend to privilege an account of 
the world that reflects the interest of those who are dominant within a particular area. 
Given that the study partakes not in the above epistemological and ontological debates 
of IR and political science, it suffices to state that the concern of this enquiry forms part 
of peace studies and peacemaking literature, whether one locates it under political 
science or IR.  
Peacemaking is necessitated by conflict. The world today has accepted that conflict has 
become a word that is frequently located in most reports on contemporary challenges to 
the African continent. Such is, indeed, also the case for the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) region. Put differently, the SADC region is not 
immune to conflicts. The region has witnessed conflicts of the worst kind that have left 
negative footprints on the family and public life of its inhabitants. It is for the same 
reason that, when SADC, the successor of the Southern Africa Coordination Conference 
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(SADCC),  was established, in 1992, peace promotion was one of the key considerations 
in the mandate formulation of this regional body (Nathan, 2006). Specifically, the SADC 
Treaty provides for the following under Article 4 (principles) and 5 (objectives): 
SADC and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following principles: … (b) 
solidarity, peace and security … (e) peaceful settlement of disputes [and provided that 
the] … objectives of SADC shall be to: (c) promote and defend peace and security. 
(SADC Trade, 2011) 
Peacemaking is fundamental in the maintenance of peace and security in the SADC 
region. Peacemaking is a necessity; it is a common good and, indeed, an ingredient in 
the maintenance, sustenance and guaranteeing of a security community (Nathan, 2004). 
It is a reactive measure that seeks to create an enabling environment for conflict 
settlement and post-conflict reconstruction (Du Pisani, 2010). Studies on contemporary 
peacemaking call for a need to rethink and to generate a proper understanding of 
peacemaking and peace processes, because peacemaking is not an end in itself, but a 
means to an end. Indeed, this means that peacemaking needs to be studied and 
researched if rethinking and addressing current challenges is the focus of concern. In 
discussing contemporary peacemaking, Darby and Mac Ginty (2008:5–6) challenge that: 
Contemporary peacemaking … is often a creature of the international community and 
their co-opted national elites and has limited connection with the bulk of citizens in the 
war-affected state … contemporary peacemaking … often reinforces power-holders and 
replicates exclusive patterns of social and political relations. 
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Darby and Mac Ginty’s observation is corroborated by many peacemaking operations, 
including those that took place in the SADC region. In such conflicts, there have always 
been some direct or indirect foreign hands – before, during or after the active conflict.  
The above debate regarding location and contextualisation of peacemaking as far as 
SADC is concerned assists in understanding the subject matter to be discussed in this 
study. It is concerned with the peacemaking that is undertaken in SADC by a particular 
country, Namibia, which itself had conflict experiences. Namibia suffered more than 
100 years of brutal colonialism and apartheid. It is a post-conflict reconstruction society 
that must, therefore, be of interest to those concerned with issues of peace, conflict and 
post-conflict reconstruction. The researcher thus endeavours to provide a comparative 
analysis of Namibia’s peacemaking role in the SADC region, giving comparative 
analytical clarity as to its role in peacemaking in the DRC (between 1998 and 2002) and 
Angola (between 1996 and 2002). As is practice in the social sciences, academic 
enquiries of this nature are not conducted delinked from the existing literature. The 
practice in the social sciences had been and remains locating a study within a particular 
theoretical framework in the field. This study would also provide an overview of the 
theoretical and scholarly work done on peacemaking. To obtain a correct conceptual 
understanding of the concept peacemaking, this chapter, on conceptualization and 
Operationalization section, will define peacemaking in the context of the study. 
1.2 Rationale of the study 
Since obtaining independence on 21 March 1990, Namibia has been involved in 
peacekeeping, peacebuilding and – important to this study – peacemaking. Just two 
years after its independence, in 1992, this small state (in terms of both military and 
economic power) sent its troops to Cambodia as part of the United Nations (UN) peace 
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support operation; it was involved in Angola and the DRC (Ndaitwah, 2010). While a 
substantial amount of research has been undertaken into peacemaking in the SADC 
region by African researchers and others, there are generally very few studies focused 
on the role of Namibia. In the first analytical study of Namibia’s foreign policy, 
Mushelenga (2008:9) – who is currently Namibia’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs – 
confirms the above, saying: 
very little research has been conducted on Namibia’s foreign policy. A large part of the 
… literature on Namibia’s foreign policy is found in the speeches of the President, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and other Government officials. Academic research on 
Namibia’s foreign policy is limited to four publications which were all produced by the 
same author, Andre Du Pisani, Professor of Political Science at the University of 
Namibia, who, accordingly, admitted that. 
As Mushelenga (2008) expounds above, the subject, peacemaking, is truly solely left to, 
and monopolised by, government bureaucrats and politicians in the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and the Presidency. Politicians come and go; there is limitation 
to the transfer of institutional memory by word of mouth, hence a need for studies such 
as this to subject these political events to analytical and academic enquiry for a greater 
understanding of the country’s peacemaking role. The study is thus undertaken for 
contributory purposes, being conducted to fill the gap exposed above. It is intended to 
add to the little research that there is and hopefully to encourage further research. 
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1.3 Literature review 
1.3.1 SADC ‘peace profile’  
While the subject under consideration (the unit of analysis) for this study is Namibia, it 
is fitting to consider the SADC ‘peace profile’, for it is under the banner of SADC that 
some of Namibia’s peacemaking activities in the region have been conducted. 
Additionally, SADC always features in regional conflict resolution in one way or the 
other. To understand peace in SADC, the study of SADC’s institutional character is of 
paramount importance.  
In 1992 states in the southern African region concluded the treaty that established 
SADC. Specifically, Article 4 of the SADC Treaty stated that the purpose of SADC, 
among many, was that of peaceful settlement of disputes. Such a declaration did not 
take place in a vacuum, as Meyns (2002) establishes, one is not to understand peace and 
security in SADC in isolation, for the ultimate responsibility of peace and security in 
Africa is with the African Union, while that for world peace and security rests on the 
shoulders of the UN. It is for the same reason that the preamble of the SADC Protocol 
on Politics, Defence and Security recognises the UN Security Council and the 
Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU’s) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution.  
It is, however, fitting to note that the above-mentioned Mechanism is no longer in 
existence, as is neither the OAU itself. The latter became the African Union (AU), which 
was launched in July 2002, while the former (Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution) was replaced by the AU Peace and Security Council, 
which entered into force on 26 December 2003 (AU, 2011; Mwanasali, 2009).  
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Following the establishment of SADC in 1992, up until April 1996, SADC was 
characterised by discussions pertaining to the establishment of the security structure 
aimed at dealing with security fractures in the region. The SADC 1993 Framework and 
Strategy document was very clear on this call, as it was on the key principles 
characterising the security order. It generated debates until 28 June 1996, when the 
summit of the heads of state and government convened in Gaborone (Botswana), where 
they finally established the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation 
(OPDS) (Nathan, 2006; SADC, 1992; 2003). In the years that followed, disagreement 
emerged among member states on the vision and approach that would constitute the 
politics of the SADC OPDS. Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania felt 
that the basis of the OPDS, in its quest for cooperation and peacemaking, must be 
political rather than military. In contrast, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia proposed a 
mutual defence pact that prioritised military cooperation as a way forward for the 
OPDS (Isaksen, 2002; Nathan, 2006). Meyns (2002:153) put it: 
The SADC Organ was initially established in 1996, but within a year a major dispute 
erupted between the Chairperson of the Organ, Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe, and 
the Chairperson of SADC, South Africa’s President Nelson Mandela, as to how the Organ 
was to conduct its affairs in relation to the overall structures of SADC. The result was that 
the Organ remained dormant for several years … 
As can be understood from the above, the organ caused major differences in the region. 
These differences became more profound when the conflict in the DRC reached its peak. 
This discussion is captured in chapter 3 in more details. Be it as it may, amidst such 
differences, the SADC heads of state and government signed the Protocol on Politics, 
Defence and Security Co-operation, at the gathering in Blantyre, Malawi, on 14 August 
2001. The Protocol provided an institutional framework that would enable the member 
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states to coordinate politics, defence and security-related policies and activities (SADC, 
2003).   
From its inception, it was widely expected that SADC would promote peace and 
security and common political values. In conflict studies, there is a notion called ‘path 
dependence’ that is basically the idea that, once an event occurs, or is introduced, it is 
very difficult to reverse it, meaning that historical or past events are instrumental in the 
course of action that individuals/states may choose in the present. The term means that 
trigger events cannot be divorced from understanding present behavioural patterns 
(Pierson, 2000). It was, hence, widely expected that the path of peace pursued in the 
region after the end of the Cold War, the defeat of colonialism and apartheid would 
help sustain stability, peace, development and security in the region.  
The emergence of conflicts in both the DRC and Angola was to change the dynamics in 
SADC, especially with regards to the Organ. The conflicts put such SADC objectives as 
the enhancement of common political values and the promotion of peace and security 
to the test. Apart from the testing of SADC and the Organ, the conflicts also presented a 
challenge in finding a common approach to conflict resolution in the region. The DRC 
continues to be a conflict prone area, while Angola has yet to benefit from 
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction (Isaksen & Tjønneland, 2001; Le Pere, 
2004; Nathan, 2006).  
This does not, however, mean that there has not been some positive progress in the two 
countries. It simply means that they are still recovering as post-conflict societies. There 
have been noteworthy achievements in both the DRC and Angola. Angola is adjusting 
extremely well economically, with its former belligerents now co-existing peacefully. By 
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2008, Angola was already the second largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa, with 
oil production levels of more than 1.1 million barrels per day. All this was impossible in 
war time, when the government had control of only some regions, while the other 
regions remained in the hands of the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA) rebels (Mills, 2009). The Lusaka Peace protocol of 1999, together with 
the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (2001–2002) and the 2002 Pretoria Agreement are 
noteworthy successes as far as the DRC is concerned. The return to normality in the 
DRC cannot be downplayed in its importance as a success in itself, considering that it 
marked an end to the far-reaching conflict that claimed approximately 4 million lives 
(CCR, 2009). 
1.3.2 Peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
While the general definition of ‘peacemaking’ is taken, in the current thesis, as that 
which is provided by Nzimba (2002), in which he presents ‘peacemaking’ as having to 
do with arbitration and power mediation to control hostility, the UN, in its 2008 
peacekeeping operations principles and guidelines document, defines ‘peacemaking’ as 
“action to bring hostile parties to agreement”. One finds, in the analysis of the literature 
that the words ‘peacemaking’ and ‘peacekeeping’ are sometimes used interchangeably 
and are often discussed towards ‘peacebuilding’. Put differently, ‘peacemaking’ and 
‘peacekeeping’ are often seen as forerunners of ‘peacebuilding’, for the latter is 
unthinkable amidst violent and volatile conflicts. The UN, in the above-mentioned 
document, goes further to define ‘peacekeeping’ as an “action undertaken to preserve 
peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing 
agreements achieved by the peacemakers”.  
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‘Peacekeeping’, according to Smith (2004), is understood in the context of the 
deployment of peace-keeping forces and the military, as well as of the police and 
civilian personnel. Following the definition of ‘peacemaking’ and ‘peacekeeping’, the 
UN document goes further to define ‘peacebuilding’ as “measures aimed at reducing 
the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, by strengthening national capacities for 
conflict management, and laying the foundations for sustainable peace”. Jeong (2005) 
sees ‘peacebuilding’ as referring to a situation in which normal social activities can be 
resumed, after conflict has been contained, for the rebuilding of society. It is also 
understood, therein, as an action to identify and to support structures that tend to 
strengthen and to solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse of conflict. ‘Peacebuilding’ 
includes the consideration of issues of conflict origin, addressing issues pertaining to 
socio-economic foundations, political framework, and security, including reconciliation 
and justice (Jeong, 2005; Smith, 2004; UN, 2008). According to the UN, the gap between 
the three concepts is increasingly narrowing, as is illustrated in Figure 1.1 below.  
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Figure 1.1 shows the UN illustration of how the “the boundaries between conflict prevention, 
peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred” 
(UN: 2008, 19).  
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1.3.3 Namibia in peacemaking  
Chapter 1, Article 1 (1) of the Namibian Constitution, on the establishment of the 
Republic of Namibia and the identification of its territory, defines Namibia as a secular, 
democratic and unitary state that is founded upon the principles of democracy, of the 
rule of law and of justice for all (Republic of Namibia, 1989). The country has a well-
known history of both conflict and peacemaking. In discussing the rules and procedures 
for negotiated peacemaking in Namibia and South Africa, Du Toit (2008) considers 
Namibia as a very successful case of democratic transition, and, subsequently, of the 
peacemaking activities during the processes of gaining independence. He discusses 
peacemaking in Namibia in the context of post-Cold War transitions, arguing that such 
peacemaking in Namibia was a multilateral affair, for the conflict was extremely 
internationalised. This view is corroborated by the view expressed by the founding 
President, Sam Nujoma, in his inaugural speech made on 21 March 1990. On said 
occasion, President Nujoma remarked:  
… for the past 43 years or so, this land of our forbearers was a bone of contention between 
the Namibian people and the international community, on one hand, and South Africa, on 
the other. The Namibian problem was at the center of a bitter international dispute over the 
past four decades. The United Nations and other international bodies produced huge 
volumes of resolutions, in an attempt to resolve this intractable problem. However, it 
pleases me to state that we are gathered here today, not to pass yet another resolution, but 
to celebrate the dawn of a new era in this land … 
(//Gowaseb, 2010:284) 
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The international character of peacemaking in Namibia that chartered the way forward 
from independence has been instrumental in helping to shape the country’s well-hailed 
liberal constitution. Five liberal democratic countries, namely France, Germany, Britain, 
Canada and the United States, had set the context for the new constitution with their 
influence on the constitution principles to inform the Constituent Assembly that drafted 
the Namibian Constitution (Geingob, 2004). As such, Chapter 11, Article 96 of the 
Namibian constitution (on Foreign Relations) states that Namibia is, among many other 
imperatives, to promote: 
International cooperation, peace and security; [to] foster(s) respect for international law and 
treaty obligations; [and to] encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful 
means. 
(Republic of Namibia, 1989:46–47) 
Such principles were to prove decisive in the pattern of peacemaking and conflict 
resolution that was followed in post-independence Namibia. When the conflict between 
Namibia and Botswana over the Kasikili/Sedudu Island issue unfolded (Ashton, 2000), 
Namibia, guided by the constitutional provision on the “settlement of international 
disputes by peaceful means”, opted not to wage war against Botswana, but rather to 
seek peaceful resolution of the conflict by taking the case before the International Court 
of Justice. Namibia subsequently lost the case, but continued to coexist with its 
neighbouring state, the winning party, peacefully. The country’s continuous 
participation in various UN and African peacemaking/peacekeeping (see appendixes I, 
II and III) missions occurred in the same spirit, especially in regards to the provision on 
the respect of ‘international law’ and ‘treaty obligations’. As Mushelenga (2008) has 
established, President Hifikepunye Pohamba (the successor of the first President who is 
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now the incumbent President), in his inaugural address of 21 March 2005, stated that 
the country would continue supporting conflict prevention, resolution and 
management in Africa.  
In supplementing the above discussions, Dzinesa & Rupiya (2005:222-231) find that: 
 Namibia’s first engagement in UN peacekeeping operations was the dispatch of a 
 contingent of 43 soldiers and equipment to work as part of the United Nations 
 Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). UNTAC was established by UN 
 Security Council Resolution 745 of 28 February 1992, to ensure the implementation of 
 the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, 
 signed in Paris on 23 October 1991.  The NDF also contributed personnel to serve on 
 the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) III in 1996. UN Security 
 Council Resolution 976 of 8 February 1995 established the multidimensional 
 UNAVEM III to assist the government and UNITA in restoring peace and achieving 
 national reconciliation against a fragile politico-military background.[In 2003] an NDF 
 contingent of 855 personnel served with the United Nations Mission in Liberia 
 (UNMIL). These included 844 troops, six civilian police, four staff officers and three 
 military observers.  
 
The authors further summarises Namibia’s peacemaking role as follows: 
 
 [Namibia] collaborated with the ANC in South Africa during the crucial period of 
 the 1990s; spurned the military option and agreed to the International Court of  Justice 
 arbitration in a potentially explosive incident with Botswana; continued to offer  its 
 political and military support to Angola; was capable of dealing with a  potentially 
 divisive internal security situation in the Caprivi Strip through military  and active 
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 diplomatic engagement with its neighbours; discharged its regional security 
 obligations under SADC by deploying forces in the DRC; and created a  network of 
 security and defence protocols with all its neighbours while continuing to train,  equip 
 and consolidate professionalism in the NDF. 
 Through Namibia’s judicious use of the military, Southern Africa is host to a unique 
 experience, the relevance of which is worth sharing with other regions of the world 
 that are struggling to emerge from protracted conflict. 
 
1.4 Aims and objectives of the study 
The primary aim of the study is to provide a comparative analysis of Namibia’s 
peacemaking role in the SADC region with reference to the DRC and the Angolan 
conflict respectively. This comparative analysis is essential in establishing Namibia’s 
peacemaking profile and effort in the region. In that context, the study’s additional aims 
and objectives are that of asking questions examining and appraising the extent to 
which Namibia was actually engaged in effective peacemaking in the two cases under 
consideration? Said differently, the study will assess whether Namibia genuinely 
engaged in peacemaking.  
The secondary aim of the study is to provide a descriptive account of Namibia’s 
peacemaking role in the selected cases. 
The study, in its comparative analysis, will determine the similarities and differences 
between the two cases under study. Furthermore, the study will determine which of the 
two cases was more outstanding and yielded successes and why?  
1.5 Conceptualization and operationalization 
What a researcher means when using certain concepts is very important in social 
science research of this kind. The way in which the researcher measures the concepts is 
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also of importance. The concepts that require explaining are key concepts used in 
formulating research questions. The definitions of concepts and how they are to be 
measured is called ‘conceptualisation’ and ‘operationalisation’. Babbie (2010:157) 
defines conceptualisation as “the process of specifying observations and measurements 
that give concepts definite meaning for the purpose of a research study”. He adds that 
operationalisation “is an extension of conceptualization that specifies the exact 
procedures that will be used to measure the attributes of variables”. 
This study adopts the UN conceptualisation of ‘peacemaking’ as the actions and 
measures taken to address a conflict that is already in motion (UN, 2008).  
 
The UN, in its 2008  ‘Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines’ document, 
explicitly defined peacemaking as generally including “measures to address conflicts in 
progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated 
agreement.” The document further adds that “Peacemakers may also be envoys, 
governments, groups of states, regional organizations or the United Nations. 
Peacemaking efforts may also be undertaken by unofficial and non-governmental 
groups, or by a prominent personality working independently ” (UN, 2008).  
 
Darby & Mac Ginty (2008:1), in their book, ‘Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace 
Processes and Post-War Reconstruction,’ followed the UN definition on the diversity of 
peacemakers and observe that “many international organizations, governments, 
militant groups, NGOs, and communities have gained vast experience of making, 
keeping, and building peace.”  
 
Ouellet (2003) discusses peacemaking in context of the UN Charter and writes that 
“peacemaking is the diplomatic effort intended to move a violent conflict into 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
          
 
16 
nonviolent dialogue, where differences are settled through representative political 
institutions.  The objective of peacemaking is thus to end the violence between the 
contending parties. Article 33 of the UN Charter specifies, "negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, [and] resort to regional agencies 
or arrangements" as modes of peaceful intervention in violent conflicts. Articles 41 and 
42 of the Charter also allow for sanctions, blockading, and violent intervention in order 
to restore the peace between warring states.”  
Conflict, in this study, is defined as a situation in which two parties have antagonistic 
views and goals as to what must constitute their present or their future. These 
conflicting views and goals subsequently result in the parties committing violent 
actions against each other. Each views the other as an obstacle in the path that they 
intend to travel to achieve their goals. To the antagonistic parties, the only way that 
they can see of attaining their goals is to destroy, to eliminate, or to remove each other 
from the occupied positions or from the status held.  
In the light of the above conceptual definitions, ‘peacemaking’ can, therefore, be defined 
operationally in the given context as, for example, when one state sends military 
personnel to another country in order to halt a dispute between two antagonistic 
parties. The process can also operate at the diplomatic level, as opposed to taking the 
form of military action. When such is the case, one or more nation states send envoys to 
encourage the antagonistic parties to stop their belligerent and violent actions towards 
each other and to see how they can find common grounds and subsequent peace.  
This study operationally views sending troops, including the diplomatic efforts made in 
this respect, to aid a legitimate government that is under attack by a foreign or domestic 
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aggressor(s) as ‘peacemaking’, for the ultimate aim of the help-seeking government is to 
avert the aggressor(s), so that peace prevails in that state. 
1.6 Research Design 
1.6.1 Unit of Analysis 
The term ‘unit of analysis’ is defined as ‘the what or whom being studied’ or the ‘unit, 
case, or part of social life that is under consideration’ (Neuman, 2006, 58: Babbie, 2010, 
98). For the purpose of this study, the unit of analysis is Namibia between 1996 and 
2002. The study endeavors to provide a comparative analysis of Namibia’s 
peacemaking role in the cases considered.  
1.6.2 Time Dimension 
This is a longitudinal study, for it makes observations over an extended period of time. 
The study makes observations regarding peacemaking cases in which Namibia was 
involved between 1996, the year in which the first intervention occurred and 2002, the 
year in which the last conflict in the region ended. The time under study for the 
Angolan case study is 1996 to 2002 while for the DRC is 1998 to 2002. 
 
1.6.3 Research Methodology 
This study is in the form of what is called qualitative research, as opposed to 
quantitative research. The latter type of research is focused, organised and systematic, 
making use of a linear path to research. This is the type of research that is often used in 
the natural sciences, although it is also used in the social sciences. Qualitative research, 
in contrast, is a type of research that is less structured and more flexible, and which 
adopts a non-linear approach to research. Qualitative research examines the ideas, 
motives, themes, words, observations, and transcripts (Babbie & Mouton, 2008; Babbie, 
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2010; Neuman, 2006). In the words of Babbie and Mouton (2001:53), qualitative research 
refers:  
… to that generic research approach in social research according to which research takes 
its departure point as the insider perspective on social action … the emphasis, therefore, is 
on methods of observation and analysis that ‘stay close’ to the research subject. This would 
include observational methods such as structured interviewing, participant observation 
and use of personal documents. In the analysis of qualitative data, the emphasis is on 
grounded theory and other more inductive analytical strategies. 
The stated qualitative research takes form of comparative analysis. Developed by the 
British philosopher and theorist John Stuart Mill (1806 – 1873), comparative analysis is a 
research method that seeks to identify agreements and differences between cases being 
studied (Neuman: 2006). This method is understood, by Neuman (2006:471), as “a 
qualitative data analysis in which a researcher uses the method of agreement and the 
method of difference to discover causal factors that affect an outcome among a set of 
cases.” Mills et al (2006: 621) view comparative analysis as a method whose goal is to:  
 
  Search for similarity and variance…comparative research is used to separate patterns that 
are more general and isolate regularities from the context laden environment. 
 
This method carries various advantages. As Mills et al (2006: 621) points out, 
“comparisons not only uncover differences between social entities, but reveal unique 
aspects of a particular entity that would be virtually impossible to detect otherwise.” 
For Neuman (2006:472-473), the advantages of comparative analysis is its ability to 
allow “different causal factors to produce an outcome and considers highly complex 
outcomes that have qualitative difference.” Mahoney & Rueschemeyer (2003:13) 
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consolidates the above in asserting that comparative analysis is “distinctive because its 
practitioners engage in systematic contextualized comparisons of similar and 
contrasting cases. While this approach does not directly aim for universally applicable 
knowledge, it represents a bargain in which significant advantages are gained. Above 
all, the approach makes possible a dialogue between the theory and evidence of an 
intensity that is rare in quantitative social research.”  
 
The above is the approach and manner in which the current study is conducted. This 
methodology would allow for a critical appraisal of Namibia’s peacemaking role in the 
selected case studies. In others words, qualitative research is selected in conducting a 
study whose aims and objectives are for a comparative analysis of the selected cases.  
1.6.3.1 Data gathering Methods 
This study takes the form of ‘desktop’ research, based on both primary and secondary 
data. Primary sources such as legislations, constitutions, official documents such as UN, 
SADC and AU convections and protocols are used to collect data. It makes use of 
secondary data such as books, academic journals, newspaper articles, internet articles 
and reports. This is to say that this contribution to the body of knowledge in the field 
will be based on the existing literature in the field. 
1.6.4 Anticipated problems  
While peacemaking literature would often be in a common language that is understood 
by all parties, this does not mean that there would not be literature on an uncommon 
language that would be of benefit to the study. Due to the fact that the official language 
in all countries that form the selected cases, the DRC and Angola, is not English, there 
might be some literature that will be in the official languages of these countries, in 
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which the researcher is not, in any way, conversant. This might be an impediment. To 
address this possible impediment, the researcher secured the services and assistance of 
two fellow researchers, should such scenario unfold. Both are citizens of the countries 
under study, the DRC and Angola, and are fluent in the official languages and 
indigenous languages spoken in the countries. 
1.7 Limitations of the study 
The study will only be able to provide a descriptive account of the role of Namibia in 
peacemaking in the SADC region between 1996 and 2002, and not beyond. Put 
differently, the study will not be able to go beyond SADC, just as, in the same way, it is 
not able to explain the role of post-independence Namibia in peacemaking in the world, 
for that is not studied herein. The study focuses on peacemaking and cannot be used to 
describe patterns of peacebuilding, for the concepts, although closely related, are not 
the same. 
1.8 Chapter outline 
The study is organized into six (6) chapters in total. While the real analysis is to be 
carried out in chapter 5, the researcher wishes to point out that for each  chapter 
concerning the case studies, there will be a brief look at the role of Namibia in 
peacemaking in that particular conflict.  
Chapter one (1) introduces the study – A comparative analysis of Namibia’s 
peacemaking role in the SADC region - the case of the DRC and Angola (1996 - 2002). It 
concerns itself with methodological aspects of the study. It indicates aspects of what is 
studied, how it is studied, why is it studied and where is it studied. The chapter include 
what has already been said, literature survey, on the same topic in the field.  
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Chapter two (2) is the conceptual framework of the study. In this chapter, peacemaking 
is located in wider literature. The chapter will look at what has been written by scholars, 
at different levels, on peacemaking. Specific emphasis is placed on peacemaking in 
Africa.  
Chapter three (3) is on the first case study – the DRC. The chapter looks at Namibia’s 
peacemaking role in that conflict. It discusses how and why Namibia participated in 
peacemaking in this particular conflict and its actual participation. Emphasis is placed 
on the peacemaking role in this conflict. Given the controversy of this study, the chapter 
will contain a critical analysis of Namibia’s involvement surrounding the question of 
the exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC. In order to provide a good 
understanding, the chapter discusses the history of the DRC conflict, in brief, towards 
Namibia’s involvement and subsequently the peace process culminating into the 
signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement in 2002.  
Chapter four (4) discusses another case study, Angola. As is the case in the first case 
study, in chapter three, the Angolan conflict is discussed in its historical context and 
then Namibia’s peacemaking role in it. The chapter carries the conflict until the 
assassination of UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, marking the return of peace to Angola.  
Chapter five (5) carries out a comparative analysis of the two cases. It looks at the 
similarities between the cases and also looks at the differences. Upon identifying the 
similarities and the differences, a summary is then given to put together a reflection of 
the comparative analysis.  
Chapter six (6) concludes the study by unleashing the key findings of the study. It 
concludes by putting together all the chapters covered in the study in giving a final 
perspective of what was studied.    
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CHAPTER 2 – THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter is aimed at a critical appraisal and evaluation of theoretical debates on the 
subject of peacemaking. The chapter is not a discussion of the cases for the study, 
although minor references are made, but an attempt to locate and capture the 
theoretical work of the topic. Such is done to orientate the reader with the wider 
literature on peace studies to which the study belongs. 
The chapter looks at six conceptual debates; peacemaking internationally, peacemaking 
in Africa, the effectiveness of SADC peacemaking, the question of traditional and 
indigenous peacemaking approaches, the subject of gender and the inclusion of women 
in peacemaking and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. 
The section on ‘Peacemaking internationally’ looks at the UN as the organization with 
the mandate of ensuring world peace. It looks at UN peacemaking engagements in the 
countries selected as case studies and also looking at Namibia. Brief mention of the 
historicity of the UN failures and shortcomings is also made therein. The following 
section, peacemaking in Africa, firstly looks at the AU and its security structure. 
Scholars’ analyses of the shortcomings of the AU are stated. The above is followed by 
an assessment of SADC peacemaking as to whether it is effective enough. Some scholars 
argue that current peacemaking, western inspired, is problematic and we should rather 
look at traditional and indigenous approaches to peacemaking. The theoretical debates 
on gender and the exclusion of women is covered under the section of gender and 
women in peacemaking followed by the discussion on what is known as the 
Responsibility to Protect concept. 
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2.2 Peacemaking Internationally 
As already stated in chapter 1, the ultimate responsibility of world peace is shouldered 
on the UN. It is for that reason that this organization has been involved in various 
peacemaking activities worldwide. Article 1 of the UN charter explicitly states the 
purpose of the UN as to: 
 maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of 
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and 
in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement 
of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. 
       (UN, 2011)  
Over the years, the UN has often managed to keep to the above charter provisions. The 
UN participated in peacemaking and peacekeeping in conflicts involving countries 
studied herein, including Namibia itself. It passed resolution 435, in 1978, which paved 
the way for the independence of Namibia.  This resolution, implemented in the late 
1980s, authorised the deployment of 6 150 UN forces to see through the transition from 
South African rule to self-determination. Under the stewardship of Marthi Ahtisaari, 
the UN fully implemented resolution 435; Namibia obtained Independence on 21 March 
1990 (Gambari, 2003: Manning, 1989).  
The UN also partook in peacemaking and peacekeeping activities in Angola where UN 
missions such as MONUA and various UNAVEM missions were commissioned. Unlike 
in Namibia where the UN mission went somewhat smoothly, the UN missions in 
Angola faced major challenges such that it had to withdraw twice. The UN had 
intervened in the Congo, in 1960, during a brief rule of Patrice Lumumba with dismal 
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performances. Following the signing of the Lusaka peace accord in July 1999, the UN 
Security Council passed resolution 1279 that that gave birth to MONUC. MONUC 
entailed sending of 5 537 UN troops and observers to oversee the implementation of the 
Lusaka peace accord (Gambari, 2003: UN, 2011: MONUC, 2011). 
Gambari (2003) discusses various shortcomings and peacemaking failures of the UN in 
Africa. He points to difficulties the UN faced in Sierra Leone with UNAMSIL in May 
2000 when the UN peacekeepers where scandalously disarmed and kidnapped. 
Another debacle was witnessed in the DRC with MONUC when it had to deploy more 
peacekeepers. The UN also struggled in Western Sahara. Like it did in Angola, the UN 
was weakened during United Nations Operation In Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in mid 
1990s. In April 1994, during United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), 
the ill-equipped UN force saw the devastating Rwandan genocide. Faced with 
seemingly evident dismal failure of the UN in maintaining world peace, the then UN 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan, commissioned a panel of experts, in early 2000, to make 
an appraisal  of existing UN system of dealing with peace and security issues. The panel 
in its report, known as The Brahimi report, made recommendations such as 
strengthening “UN capacity to undertake future peacemaking, peacekeeping, and 
peacebuilding operations...[it also emphasized] the necessity for clear and realistic 
mandates for UN peacekeeping operations, and clear robust doctrines and means with 
which to undertake such missions…[it additionally called for] strengthening the 
capacity of the UN to develop peacebuilding strategies and to implement programs in 
support of these strategies” (Gambari: 2003,261). 
 
Apart from the clarity provided by the UN 2008 document described earlier, Article 51 
of the UN charter provides for situation under which peacemaking can occur not under 
the authorization or sanctioning of the Security Council. It states: 
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
       (UN, 2011)  
As will be discussed later in the study, this provision has been cited by SADC allied 
forces when they intervened in the DRC conflict. It can arguably be the motivation 
behind states signing mutual defence pacts. In summary; at the international level, 
peacemaking mainly takes place under the custodianship of the UN Security Council 
while it can also take place on initiation of individual states as provided for above.  
Faced with the prevalence of devastating conflicts in Africa; the UN expressed the need 
to strengthen the capacity of the AU in preventing and managing conflict. The former 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in a letter, dated 11 December 2006, addressed to the 
President of the General Assembly, writes:  
I wish to apprise you of the Secretariat's efforts relating to the implementation of 
General Assembly resolution 60/1 (2005 World Summit Outcome), in which Member 
States broadly addressed themselves to meeting the special , needs of Africa and  agreed 
to the development and implementation of a 10-year plan for capacity- ' building with 
the African Union. In furtherance of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, Mr. Alpha 
Oumar Konare, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, and I signed in 
Addis Ababa, on 16 November 2006, a Declaration entitled "Enhancing UN-AU 
Cooperation: Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African 
Union". The Declaration ... reflects the common commitment of the United Nations and 
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the African Union to maintaining peace and human security, promoting human rights 
and post-conflict reconstruction and advancing Africa's  development and regional 
integration. Finally, it provides a holistic framework for  United Nations system-wide 
support to the capacity-building efforts of the AU  Commission and African 
subregional organizations (the regional economic  communities). 
 
(UN, 2006) 
 
2.3 Peacemaking in Africa 
As is the responsibility of the UN to ensure world peace, the responsibility of ensuring 
peace in Africa is with the AU. Compared to the UN structure, the AU Peace and 
Security Council (PSC) is the counterpart of the UN Security Council. Coming into 
effect on 26 December 2003, the 15 member states body is the authoritative structure 
that deals with peace and security matters on the continent (AU: 2011).  While there has 
been some notable successes of the AU in peacemaking and conflict resolution in cases 
such as Sudan, Somalia (albeit debatable due to continuous conflict), Burundi and 
others, scholars have identified several weaknesses of the AU (Anning, 2005). Sharamo 
(2006) points to various shortcomings and constraints of the AU. To this scholar, the AU 
is a young organization that lacks institutional experience and capacity. He adds that 
the organization is constrained by serious financial and logistical challenges in handling 
and preventing violent conflicts. He finds AU member states as not genuine in solving 
African conflicts and further alleges that security policies of the AU are dominated by 
international interest. Due to the above factors, the AU is often made and reduced to a 
spectator in continental conflicts. ACCORD (2011), on its peacemaking unit, 
consolidates:  
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An analysis of conflicts in Africa between 1990 and 2010 shows a considerable decline in 
conflicts on the continent. This is due to many reasons, among them peacemaking 
interventions and advances in non-military forms of conflict resolution. Nonetheless, 
Africa today is still affected by armed conflicts that undermine efforts to bring about much 
needed sustainable socio-economic development that is required for the continent to 
effectively compete in the international arena. Peace and security is therefore a 
prerequisite for sustainable development on the continent. 
African peacemaking is faced with a number of challenges. One of the challenges is 
socioeconomic inequalities and equitable wealth distribution while others is 
HIV/AIDS. Africa is faced with serious socioeconomic inequalities and skewed 
distribution of wealth. Scholars such as Reno (2000), Zartman (2005), Collier (2000), 
Kaldor (2007) and Jackson (2006) all recognise that conflict in Africa is brought about 
by grievances and discontentment with socioeconomic inequalities and skewed 
distribution of wealth. For Du Rand (2008), greed and the desire of wealth 
accumulation is also a contributing factor to conflict. Tripodi and Patel (2002) write on 
the impacts of HIV/AIDS on peace support operations. They find that one of the 
challenges to African peacemaking is HIV/AIDS. They capture the debate at the UN 
level on how to prevent soldiers on peace operations from spreading HIV/AIDS from 
and to places of missions deployed. They make reference to the 1998 UNAIDS report 
that found that military personnel and camps of peace operation forces attract sex 
workers thus increasing the chances of the spread of HIV/AIDS. They observe: 
As peacekeepers are among the most mobile populations in the world, they can easily 
become a vector for the spread of HIV both in the region where they are deployed and back 
home once the mission is completed…in Africa HIV remains a major concern for regional 
security. Largely because of its slow and protracted features the consequences of HIV 
progressively affect human beings, economic systems, society and political organizations. 
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 (Tripodi & Patel: 2002, 52-56).   
Williams (2009:3-4) argues that as of 30 June 2009, about 70% of UN deployment of 
peacekeepers have gone to the African continent. The author qualifies the above in that 
“As of 30 June 2009, the African continent is home to 10 military peace operations. Six of 
these are United Nations (UN) missions – in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Chad/Central 
African Republic (CAR) (MINURCAT), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
(MONUC), Liberia (UNMIL), Sudan (UNMIS) and Western Sahara (MINURSO). One 
mission is a hybrid UN-African Union (AU) operation in Darfur, Sudan (UNAMID). 
The other three missions are the AU operation in Somalia (AMISOM); the Economic 
Community of Central African States (CEMAC) operation in CAR (MICOPAX); and the 
Special Task Force in Burundi, run by South Africa. These operations involve over 73 
000 uniformed peacekeepers.”   
 
He identifies seven challenges facing peace operations in Africa. The first challenge is 
that of the complex nature of African conflicts. This is in reference to the fact that 
African conflicts are often cross-border conflicts while peacekeepers are deployed into a 
specific country. Peacekeepers face a challenge in implementing their mandates because 
often peace agreements leave out some of the belligerents who thus continue the war. 
The second challenge is ‘multiple Peacekeepers.’ African conflicts have witnessed 
various peacekeepers; some are from the UN, some from the AU and others from 
specific countries. These various actors make coordination difficult. Another challenge 
is that these various peacekeepers have been exposed to ‘different doctrine and training 
and use distinct equipment.’ The third challenge is that there are not enough soldiers to 
deploy on peace operations. This has been experienced with various UN missions 
which either failed to deploy on time or deployed a lower number than authorised. The 
author indentifies ‘not having enough western soldiers’ as the fourth challenge. It is 
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argued that in the 21st century, western countries only sent less than 300 uniformed 
personnel to UN peace operations on the African continent. Western soldiers, the 
author argues, are required for their ability to conduct ‘high-end military tasks’ due to 
their technical and logistical capacity. The fifth challenge is the lack of enough police 
that are needed to support peacekeeping soldiers. The author identifies ‘complex 
mandates’ as the sixth challenge facing peace operations in Africa. He argues that peace 
operation covers various aspects which make it difficult to implement; mandates 
sometimes lack clarity and ambiguity. Meaning and interpretation thus differs from 
various peacekeepers involved. The last challenge is what is referred to as   ‘Too many 
bad peacekeepers.’ This is in reference to actions of peacekeepers in territories they are 
to keep the peace. Peacekeepers have been involved in cases of corruption and in acts of 
sexual exploitation and abuse (Williams: 2009, 3-10). 
  
Williams (2009:9-10) boldly concludes that “peacekeepers are clearly not going to 
change the nature of African wars any time soon.” He argues that solutions to these 
challenges must be addressed for successful peace operations in Africa to occur. He also 
cautions that “no single organisation will be able to handle the full spectrum of conflict 
management challenges facing the continent. For the time being, the most crucial 
relationship to get right is the trilateral one between the UN, the AU and the EU. “ 
2.4 SADC Peacemaking, effective enough?  
The AU has various regional groupings of which SADC is one of them. These regional 
groupings have their own security structures. The security structure of SADC is the 
OPDS. As will be established later, it was under this body that SADC allies 
participated in the DRC conflict. Formed on 28 June 1996, Francis (2006) argues, the 
OPDS is designed to address multidimensional security issues in the region. He adds 
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that the OPDS is led based on what SADC call the Troika. The Troika includes the 
incumbent chair of the OPDS, the incoming and out-going chair.  
Apart from the OPDS, the regional body has what is called the SADC Standby Brigade, 
often referred to as the SADCBRIG. This does not imply an automatic link between the 
two apart from being structures in SADC. The genesis of the SADGBRIG is provided by 
Baker & Maeresera (2009:107) in that  “pursuant to article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of 
the African Union (AU), the Protocol on the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was 
established as a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely 
and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. Within the framework of 
article 13 of the PSC Protocol the AU Commission is mandated to establish an African 
Standby Force (ASF) which will consists of five standby brigades in each of the five 
regions in Africa. It is within this arrangement that the SADC Interstate, Defence and 
Security Committee (ISDSC) set up a technical team comprised of military planners, 
which saw the establishment of the Planning Element (PLANEM) in Gaborone, 
Botswana, in April and May 2005. An MOU was signed between member states to 
regulate the establishment of the standby brigade.”  
Following the above, the main purpose of the SADCBRIG is thus partaking in AU 
mission as outlined in article 13 of the PSC, supplemented by articles such as 4 (h and j) 
of the AU Constitutive Act. Article 13 of the PSC and article 4 of the AU Constitutive 
Act spells out how intervention is to take place in order to restore peace and security in 
a war situation. Specifically, the brigade can also intervene as permitted by SADC 
(Baker & Maeresera: 2009). The authors caution the challenge the brigade may face and 
argues that “the absence of common national interests and common values among 
member states inhibits the development of trust, institutional cohesion, common 
policies and unified responses to crises. Member states are generally reluctant to 
surrender sovereignty to a security regime that encompasses binding rules, and resist 
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ceding decision-making power on security issues to regional organizations… The initial 
decisions to intervene in the DRC and Lesotho in 1998 revealed significant and divisive 
policy positions among member states. It is reasonable, therefore, to ask whether in 
future SADC member states will be able to achieve sufficient consensus to enable the 
rapid deployment of the standby brigade to any conflict situation, particularly one 
involving a SADC member country, and even more so when that country does not 
invite the intervention…While we welcome the emergence of the SADCBRIG, and 
indeed the other components of the African Standby Force, we have written this short 
article as a caution against undue optimism regarding the potential utility of the 
SADCBRIG as a tool to intervene rapidly in a SADC member state in order to restore 
peace and security” (Baker & Maeresera:2009, 108-110).  
 
 Burgess (2011) assesses the practical challenges of the SADCBRIG and writes “The 
SADC brigade (SADCBRIG) has only partially met the total of 5,000 troops standing by. 
The shortfalls in the SADCBRIG are due to delays in implementation as much as a 
shortage of resources... Interoperable communications are a work in progress, and 
intelligence capabilities are in the process of development...the civilian component for 
multidimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding is underdeveloped. Donors still 
play a role in sustaining relevant SADC organs and the SADCBRIG.”  
 
The challenge presented above is exactly what inhibits SADC from becoming an 
effective security community. A Security Community is defined by Ngoma (2003:18) as  
“a community that transcends international boundaries in which the settlement of 
disputes by anything other than peaceful means is unthinkable.” The author goes 
further to indicate that the Security Community involves three key concepts; 
‘integration’, ‘sense of security’ and ‘peaceful change’. The author explains that a  
“security community is a group of people, which has become “integrated”. By 
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integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of security” and of 
institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to assure…dependable 
expectations of “peaceful change” among its population. By sense of community we mean 
a belief…that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of 
peaceful change.” Van Nieuwkerk (2008) also sees the challenges of security community 
in SADC. In discussing security co-operation in southern Africa, he finds three possible 
scenarios of  “A ‘mature SADC’ – a favourable socio-economic environment and wise 
leadership allows for institutional governance, reflecting deeper and mutually 
beneficial integration. SADC follows a holistic (integrated and comprehensive) 
approach to trade, economic, and security integration, accompanied by a negotiated 
road-map with realistic time lines and implementation capacity; A ‘fragile SADC’ – 
uneven development and poor leadership aggravate a polarized relationship between 
the region and a domineering South Africa. SADC follows a two-level, variable-speed 
approach to integration: fast-tracking trade and economic integration among a core 
group of countries, with sporadic security co-operation, accompanied by separate 
RISDP and SIPO implementation plans; A ‘disintegrating SADC’ – unfavourable socio-
economic conditions and visionless leaders allow for a regression in the nature of the 
relationships among countries in Southern Africa – driven by narrowly defined national 
interests, unregulated markets, or a combination of both. Co-operation is replaced by 
competition, resulting in conflict and, in the longer run, violent disagreements” (Van 
Nieuwkerk: 2008, 94).  
 
In 2003, SADC member states signed a Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) which is a 
mechanism of common security approach to conflict. Baker & Maeresera (2009) are very 
critical of the MDP. They argue that the “SADC Mutual Defence Pact is regarded as a 
collective defence strategy. It is far from clear, however, that ‘collective defence’ (as, for 
example, articulated in article 6(1), which views ‘an armed attack on a state within the 
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sub region as an attack against all’) provides adequate justification for ‘intervention in a 
member state in respect of grave circumstances’. Van Nieuwkerk points out that, while 
in essence the MDP allows for collective self-defence and collective action – stating that 
‘an armed attack against a state party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and 
security and such an attack shall be met with immediate action’ – the text of the pact 
also states that parties have the option of choosing how to respond to a call for 
immediate action…This is likely to result in a scenario in which a section of member 
states would remain ‘hawks’ (preferring military solutions), others being ‘doves’ 
(opting for more peaceful approach and diplomatic initiatives or other nonmilitary 
means), while others still would position themselves as ‘penguins’, not opting for any 
particular position but instead remaining ‘outside’ the problem whilst they publicly 
appear determined to solve them”  (Baker & Maeresera: 2009, 110). 
 
Ngoma (2003:25-26) is more optimistic and adds; “Notwithstanding some of the articles 
viewed as retrogressive to the attainment of a security community, the SADC Pact 
continually stresses some factors that point towards a peaceful collaborative 
arrangement. The Pact continues to make states and people its dominant units. It also 
takes cognizance of collective defence and the preservation of peace and stability as 
well as other provisions on defence co-operation. Together with other aspects…the Pact 
reflects an unmistakable intention by its members to establish a security community.”  
 
In analysing the effectiveness of regional peacemaking in Southern Africa, Ancas 
(2011:141) finds various specific ‘limitations that hinder the partnership it has with the 
AU and UN in carrying out effective peacemaking.’  She argues that:  
 
SADC solidarity politics, and the liberation legacy’s taboo on making censure or 
disagreement publicly known, bog down the organisation and create serious obstacles to 
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progressive SADC leadership in peacemaking. SADC has established strong protocols 
on security cooperation and safeguards on democracy and human rights, but continues 
to operate on the pillars of absolute sovereignty and solidarity. There is even an 
understanding that member states have kept the SADC secretariat weak in order to 
avoid the creation of an interventionist bureaucracy that could interfere in their sensitive 
security issues. 
 
She further qualifies cases where these limitations have occurred: 
 
SADC has remained united enough to largely keep the UN and other international 
players out of the recent conflict in Zimbabwe, where South Africa has taken a lead in 
peacemaking and tried to prevent much external interference, painting it as a Western 
anti-Zimbabwean crusade... The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security had 
been, by some accounts, manipulated to justify the aims of Zimbabwe in the DRC and 
later, to legitimise South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho.  
        Ancas (2011- 142-143) 
 
Nathan (2004:91-93) corroborates the above in summarising that “ the SADC region 
remained wracked by a high level of conflict that included civil wars in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Angola, as well as violence and state repression in other 
countries [such as Zimbabwe]. SADC was largely ineffectual in these situations, 
distinguished less by its peacemaking efforts than by its fractious internal quarrels... 
SADC does not have a record of successful peacemaking. In many intra-state conflicts it 
has refrained from critical comment and diplomatic engagement, treating violence and 
crises in governance as purely domestic affairs. In the case of state repression and 
abrogation of the rule of law in Zimbabwe, on the other hand, SADC has repeatedly 
expressed solidarity with the government. The absence of an agreed set of norms, 
strategies and procedures for addressing high-intensity conflict has contributed to 
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collective inertia, divergent and parochial approaches by individual states, ill-conceived 
interventions of doubtful legality, and a confused mixture of peacemaking and peace 
enforcement. Most of these problems were evident in SADC’s response to the crises in 
Lesotho and the DRC in 1998.”  
 
In another critique of SADC peacemaking, Nathan (2010) argued that “despite the 
existence of the Organ, SADC has a woeful record of peacemaking. In most of the crises 
that beset the region it refrained from diplomatic engagement and critical comment. It 
played no meaningful role in relation to the Angolan civil war and was deeply divided 
over the DRC rebellion. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia responded to the rebellion by 
deploying troops in support of the Congo government while South Africa, Botswana, 
Mozambique and Tanzania pursued a diplomatic solution. The divergent strategies 
generated acute animosity within SADC and crippled the Organ. The Lusaka Accord of 
1999, brokered by Zambia on behalf of SADC, achieved a partial ceasefire and provided 
the framework for inter-Congolese negotiations, but it also shifted the locus of 
peacemaking from SADC to the UN and the OAU/AU. In the case of Madagascar, 
mediation efforts by the UN, the AU and SADC have been unsuccessful.” 
 
Neethling (2000) takes a moderate approach in discussing SADC peacemaking role in 
the conflict in the DRC. He concludes that:  
 
One cannot disagree with the chief of the SANDF, General Siphiwe Nyanda, that the 
military objectives defined in the mandate were accomplished, despite the fact that 
certain tactical errors were made and the degree of armed resistance that was 
encountered, was greater than had been anticipated. It would be fair to state from a 
purely military viewpoint that Operation Boleas had been successfully conducted, as it 
did succeed in stabilising the security situation in Lesotho, which allowed the political 
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parties to resume negotiations around the issue of governance. In addition, it 
safeguarded South Africa’s interests in Lesotho and succeeded in securing strategic 
installations from being taken over or destroyed by the mutinous forces. However, the 
operation did not succeed in preventing and controlling the destruction and looting of 
property in central Maseru. From a political perspective, it has yet to be seen whether 
the operation has paved the way for fresh elections in pursuit of a medium and 
longterm political goal and settlement.  
 
To the politicians, SADC peacemaking is successful and effective. In a speech delivered 
at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on 27 February 2002, former 
President of Mozambique, Joaquim Alberto Chissano finds SADC peacemaking 
successful. He argues that: 
 
[SADC training in peacekeeping operations] were successful and have led to the  
decision of creation of a SADC peacekeeping brigade...The Extended Troika is leading 
the process of restoration of the democratic legality in Lesotho, after the  events of 1998, 
when the Opposition did not accept the results of the elections and resorted to violence... 
We are aware that the challenge of consolidating stability in Southern Africa is 
depending on the strengthening of strategies for peace building in our own countries. 
These strategies include the participation of a vast range of state and non-state actors 
and their success depends on the co-ordination and implementation by national 
governments and SADC as a whole... Southern Africa is a region with a history of 
political violence and deep suffering of the populations. Now we are building peace and 
stability. 
         (Chissano, 2002)  
 
In a study titled ‘Peacemaking in Southern Africa: The Role and Potential of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC),’ Bekoe (2002:1) focuses little on 
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the successes and failure of SADC peacemaking. Instead, upon studying DRC, Angola, 
Zimbabwe, and Lesotho, she proposes four recommendations to SADC:   
 
First, developing strategies to strengthen SADC as an institution; second,  moving from 
unanimity to either majority or weighted decision-making; third,  developing closer 
interaction with civil society, in order to promote greater legitimacy, public 
accountability, and transparency; and fourth, undertaking, as a matter of priority, a close 
examination of how SADC can contribute to the promotion of democratization and 
economic development in Southern Africa as envisioned by the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD). 
 
2.5 Towards traditional and Indigenous peacemaking? 
Current peacemaking approaches to many conflicts can be largely regarded as ‘western 
type of peacemaking’. Mac Ginty (2008) discusses this fact and points to an increasing 
interest and look towards traditional and indigenous approaches to peacemaking. 
Pointing to common failure of peace processes and peace accords, Mac Ginty (2008) 
finds that the western approach to peacemaking is often top-down, costly, technocratic 
and unable to deal with things such as trust, reconciliation and intergroup perceptions. 
Western peacemaking often excludes people by resulting only on handshakes of the 
elites leading belligerent forces (Mac Ginty: 2008).  
Traditional and indigenous peacemaking is therefore preferred because, unlike western 
peacemaking, it seen as inclusive, culturally relevant, not costly and sustainable. Unlike 
western peacemaking, traditional and indigenous peacemaking takes local needs and 
cultural sensitivities into consideration. Protagonists of traditional and indigenous 
peacemaking champion this approach as human and community-centric rather than 
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state and institution-centric (Mac Ginty: 2008).  Various traditional and indigenous 
peacemaking types such as Mato-Oput, Kgotla, Nahe Biti, and the Miss are discussed to 
illustrate this view. The Mato-Oput is a Ugandan “clan-based reconciliation ceremony 
involving an admission of wrong doing, an offer of recompense and the sharing of a 
symbolic drink between disputants.” The Kgotla is a Batswana approach that “takes the 
form of a community meeting in which everyone has a right to uninterrupted speech 
and decisions are reached on a consensus bases.” The Miss is a Kenyan traditional 
dispute resolution technique that “place strong emphasis on ritual performed by elders 
(with the slaughter of livestock and burying of weapons), community members have a 
practical input through donating food, livestock, and weapons for the peace ceremony.” 
The Nahe Biti is a customary mediation process in East Timor that “involves the ‘victim’ 
bringing a complaint to a traditional leader who facilitates a meeting between the 
disputants. Following an opening ritual, the disputants present their cases and the 
traditional leader makes a judgement, imposing a penalty or offering advice where 
appropriate. The ceremony may end with a statement by the ‘guilty party and a ritual 
in which the disputants share food and drink” (Mac Ginty, 2008: 121-127).   
Similarly, Murithi (2006:25) an African traditional and indigenous approach to 
peacemaking, Ubuntu, utilised by Archbishop Desmond Tutu during his leadership of 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation. Defining Ubuntu as “ a cultural world-view 
that tries to capture the essence of what it means to be human,” he adds that Ubuntu 
peacemaking process includes five stages such as “acknowledgement of guilt, showing 
remorse and repenting, asking for and giving forgiveness, and paying compensation or 
reparation as a prelude to reconciliation.” He concludes that “Potential lessons for peace 
and reconciliation efforts are highlighted with the premise that the Ubuntu approach to 
the building of human relationships can offer an example to the world.” 
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While the relevance of traditional and indigenous approaches to peacemaking is 
evident, Mac Ginty (2008) points to several shortcomings of this approach to 
peacemaking. He argues that traditional and indigenous approaches to peacemaking 
cannot be regarded as an antidote to all challenges faced by conventional western 
peacemaking. Conflicts have evolved and changed in type. Modern warfare has a rapid 
devastating impact than it was, centuries ago, during traditional small-scale conflicts. 
He contends that “…the dislocation associated with civil war has often made traditional 
and indigenous social patterns unsustainable… some traditional and indigenous 
practices can be deeply conservative and exclusionary. For example, they may only be 
open to men or may emphasize social conformity and the importance of power 
remaining in the hands of chiefly classes… leading states and international 
organizations, attracted by the apparent advantages offered by traditional and 
indigenous approaches to peacemaking, are funding and facilitating it. This leads to a 
fundamental question: can such methods be regarded as ‘traditional’ or ‘indigenous’ 
anymore if they have been co-opted by international organizations?” (Mac Ginty: 2008, 
120-121). He concludes by pointing out the usefulness of both traditional and 
indigenous approaches and that of western peacemaking. All of them can efficiently 
work in within their specific context and type of conflict. Therefore the two approaches 
to peacemaking can be complementary (Mac Ginty: 2008).   
 
2.6 Gender and the exclusion of women in peacemaking 
Some scholars argue that peacemaking and its processes fails and becomes 
unsustainable because of the systematic exclusion of women. Potter (2008) launches an 
argument that the gender question and women exclusion is not at the level of debate on 
the importance of addressing women exclusion in peacemaking. For her, there has been 
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an acknowledgement of the need to include women in peacemaking. What is lacking is 
the move from acknowledgement to the real action of including women in peace 
processes. She argues that “…the process and substance of peace negotiations and 
agreements would be richer, subtler, stronger, and more firmly rooted in the societies 
whose problems they aim to solve with increased participation of women and the issues 
which are important to them…the basic but forgotten fact [is that] gender is a concept 
which embraces both women and men, and exhorts more men to swell the ranks of 
those working at all levels of peacemaking…perhaps, then, one of the factors that could 
make a real difference to building peace processes which produce sustainable, equitable 
results would be to see more men among the ranks of activist, strategists, programmers, 
and implementers for equality and gendered perspectives in peace and security issues ” 
(Potter:2008, 105-116).  
Pillay (2009) extends the argument further to indicate that the problem goes beyond 
women participation in the process of peacemaking. What women experience during 
the conflict is in addition to what already existed in society. In other words, 
stereotypical notions of women and their stratification, existing in society even before a 
conflict, forms a basis of how they will experience the conflict. This is to say that women 
participation in peacemaking does not translate, practically, into changes in social 
thinking, attitudes and behaviour towards women.  
Discussing gender in analysis of the TRC of South Africa, Meintjes (2009: 111) also 
points to how women can still be subordinated even when they are part of the process. 
She argues that “despite the pressure put on TRCs from gender activists and gender 
consultants in every case, a single chapter has been devoted to delineating the 
experience of gender. Gender thus continues to be used as a synonym for women. The 
single chapter on women reproduces a flawed view that gender is simply the 
experience of women. So the most important recommendation…was ignored. The 
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consequence of this outcome was that the real nature of ‘truth’, the gendered truth, was 
elided and collapsed into women’s experience alone. So – in truth – we miss the way life 
under apartheid, or under any other kind of patriarchal regime, was systematically 
gendered.”  
For Ndlovu (2009), fighting for gender equality and the inclusion of women in 
peacemaking is accompanied by a heavy cost in patriarchal societies. She points to a 
case of a social justice group in Zimbabwe known as WOZA. Formed in 2003, WOZA is 
a 70 000 member organization that encourages women to stand up and seek redress on 
the gender question and other aspects of women interest in Zimbabwe. She points out 
that “as a result of their practice of civil disobedience, embracing a policy of strategic 
non-violence, they have been frequently subject to abuse by the police, including being 
beaten, arrested, incarcerated, tortured and insulted. As women of the grassroots, they 
are also victims of the economic effects of misrule, the destruction of homes and 
livelihoods, the collapsed economy, and the lack of food and social services. Most 
members of the organisation are struggling to survive, and as women, they bear the 
brunt of the daily search for food to feed children, for medicines, for school fees” 
(Ndlovu: 2009, 113-114).  
 
Women suffer the most when a conflict erupts. They actually suffer double compared to 
men. Apart for the obvious violence brought by conflict, women suffer from sexual and 
gender-based violence such as gang rapes, sexual slavery and reproductive violence. 
Peacemaking and peace processes led by those that suffer minimally is not only flawed 
but also short-sighted (Nabukeera-Musoke: 2009).  
 
It is important that existing peacemaking mechanisms are analysed to determine the 
effectiveness of such mechanisms. It is through such analysis that issues such as gender 
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and the exclusion of women in peacemaking surfaces. Other analysis focus on what is 
already in place. The following section discusses a peacemaking mechanism called ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect.’  
2.7 The Responsibility to Protect  
The Responsibility to Protect, popularly known as the R2P, has received much attention 
in peacemaking, especially at the beginning of the 21st century. Between 1999 and 2000, 
the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appealed to the international community to 
find ways of how events such as the Rwandan genocide and other systematic human 
right violations can be avoided and handled in the future. In response, the Canadian 
government announced, to the 2000 UN General Assembly, that it had established the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to take up that 
responsibility and subsequently produce a report to the UN Secretary General (ICISS, 
2001). This report, titled The Responsibility To Protect, made the following 
recommendations to the General Assembly, Security Council and Secretary-General:  
 
That the General Assembly adopt a draft declaratory resolution embodying the basic 
principles of the responsibility to protect, and containing four basic elements: an 
affirmation of the idea of sovereignty as responsibility; an assertion of the threefold 
responsibility of the international community of states – to prevent, to react and to 
rebuild – when faced with human protection claims in states that are either unable or 
unwilling to discharge their responsibility to protect; … That the members of the 
Security Council should consider and seek to reach agreement on a set of guidelines, 
embracing the “Principles for Military Intervention” summarized in the Synopsis, to 
govern their responses to claims for military intervention for human protection 
purposes…The Commission recommends to the Secretary-General: That the Secretary-
General give consideration, and consult as appropriate with the President of the Security 
Council and the President of the General Assembly, as to how the substance and action 
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recommendations of this report can best be advanced in those two bodies, and by his 
own further action. 
(ICISS, 2001, 74-75) 
 
 
In an interview with UN News centre on August 01 2011, the special Advisor to the UN 
Secretary-General, Edward Luck, discusses the genesis of the R2P. He argues that the 
R2P is a concept “agreed to by all the heads of state and government at the World 
Summit in 2005. They pledged that they would prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity for all the populations on their territory and that 
they would also prevent the incitement of those crimes… And if the state fails, in a 
manifest way, to protect populations, then the international community is to take timely 
and decisive action in response to try to offer protection to the threatened populations” 
(UN News Centre, 2011). The R2P is the same concept rallied upon by western countries 
in mobilising the UN to intervene in Libya. As Edward Luck corroborates: 
I think it was quite an important precedent, both in resolution 1970 that talked about 
sanctions and referring [Libyan leader Muammar] al-Qadhafi and some of his people to 
the International Criminal Court and then in resolution 1973, that talked about all 
necessary measures to protect populations – both of those invoked the responsibility to 
protect.  
(UN News Centre, 2011) 
The R2P does not only exist at the level of the UN. According to the 2008 report of the 
Institute for Global Policy’s Responsibility to Protect Engaging Civil Society project, the 
responsibility to protect is also upheld by the AU’s PSC and SADC’s OPDS. The report 
consolidates that:  
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The African Union Peace and Security architecture has the following components that 
relate to R2P three elements of prevention, reaction and rebuilding: 1. Continental Early 
Warning System 2. Peace and Security Council; supported by quiet diplomacy of the AU 
chairperson; 3. Panel of the Wise: composed of 5 highly respected personalities, devoted 
to prevention, supposedly free of political pressure; 4. Stand-by force to intervene if the 
above fails 5. Post-conflict reconstruction unit within Peace and Security Council…The 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) has a relevant Protocol on Politics, 
Defense and Security which allows the Organ to intervene in situations of intra/inter 
state conflicts. 
(Institute for Global Policy, 2008) 
 
Like any report in the social sciences, the ICISS report and the R2P doctrine has been 
subjected to various criticisms. Downes (2004) argues that the report avoided questions 
on how to differentiate interventions that are genuinely humanitarian inspired and 
those that are termed humanitarian for mere military offensives to achieve the goals of 
the big powers. For Welsh, Thielking & MacFarlane (2002:511-512):  
 The significance of the Commission’s report lies more in the realm of advocacy than 
analysis. Its treatment of a broad range of issues related to the responsibility to protect 
(prevention, criteria for intervention, mandates, command, rebuilding) reflects 
international politics as the commissioners think it should be rather than as it is. The 
ICISS does not fully recognise that international politics remains a web of contending 
normative principles and contingent political interests. Taking the desirability of 
protection as given, what we need now is a better sense of how to get from where we are 
to where we want to be.  
Falk (2000), like Downes (2004),  argues that the R2P and its humanitarian language 
would fit to be a justification and a tool, by big powers in the UN Security Council, to 
achieve foreign policy goals while Mamdani (2009) adds that while the responsibility to 
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protect might appear as an act by the international community sanctioned by the UN 
through the Security Council, it is merely a reinforcement and justification of wars by 
the permanent members of the Security council that are the great powers.  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
There is, indeed, large body of literature on peacemaking. As this chapter has shown, 
peacemaking tends to be a theme that relies heavily on the established institutions and 
practices. It is from these institutions and practices that peacemaking scholarship is 
based. The theoretical work varies in peacemaking, as this chapter has demonstrated.  
 
The UN was established to assume the responsibility of ensuring world peace. It does 
this through its Security Council. There have been various successes and failure of the 
UN. While it restored peace in some parts of the world, it witnessed genocide in others.   
 
The AU has the responsibility of ensuring peace on the African continent. There have 
been various challenges with few successes as well. In the AU institutional architecture, 
it is the Peace and Security Council that deals with issues of peace and conflict on the 
continent. The AU is assisted in this responsibility by various regional bodies of which 
the SADC is one of them. For its part, SADC has established the OPDS to deal with 
security matters in the region. The region witnessed a number of conflict including 
those to be discussed in this study, that of the DRC and Angola respectively. Scholars 
argue that the region has achieved very little in peacemaking, citing reasons such a 
solidarity politics and self-interest as factors inhibiting effective peacemaking in the 
region. 
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Faced with the challenge of the prevalence of war and conflict in the world, scholars 
proposed various solutions to ensure world peace and to avoid conflict. Among the 
suggestions include traditional and indigenous peacemaking approaches, inclusion of 
women in peacemaking and the responsibility to protect doctrine. As a result of the 
critique of each of these, it emerged clear that each has its own strengths and 
limitations.  
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CHAPTER THREE – NAMIBIA IN THE DRC CONFLICT, ALTRUISM OR 
ECONOMIC EXPEDIENCY?  
3.1 Introduction  
With the recent partitioning of the Sudan into North and South, the DRC became the 
largest country in sub-Saharan Africa, for it used to be the second largest, after Sudan. 
This largest central African state has not, as has been widely acknowledged, really 
enjoyed peace since King Leopold II pocketed it as his colony, in the 1880s, up until the 
successes of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. The lack of peace for more than a century 
has not only led to the loss of millions of lives, but has also robbed the DRC of its 
potential to become a prosperous nation, for it is one of the most, resource-rich 
countries on the face of the earth, if it is, indeed, not the most.  
This chapter discusses the DRC conflict in which Namibia participated. First, the history 
of the DRC is described, briefly, from the 1880s through to the period after the coup of 
Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu, who ruled the country with an ‘iron fist’,  until the 1997 
capturing of Kinshasa by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo 
Zaire (AFDL) led by Laurent Kabila. The rationale of a brief overview of the history of 
the DRC provides an understanding that the DRC conflict has historical roots, for one 
event has led to another.   
The following section discusses the brief period of Kabila’s presidency, leading up to 
the 1998 conflict, which is the concern of the chapter. The conflict is discussed in terms 
of its genesis, and in terms of how it has played out. Specific emphasis is placed on 
Namibia’s intervention locating the debates surrounding Namibia’s motive(s) of joining 
the war on both a domestic and international level. Before discussing the role of 
Namibia in the conflict, the chapter looks at the peace process that finally led to the 
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resolution of the conflict. Namibia played a rather interesting role in this conflict. This 
will be examined in more details in this chapter.  
3.2 The DRC before 1965 
At the famous Berlin conference in the 1880s, at which European countries met to 
partition Africa into economic spheres of interest, the DRC was allocated to King 
Leopold II. As was agreed in the Berlin Treaty, Leopold created an administration in the 
DRC ostensibly to facilitate international trade (Kabemba, 2009). Leopold II, as is 
characteristic of imperial policy, ran the DRC as an enterprise by means of which to 
amass personal wealth. As Kabemba (2009:101) observes:  
Leopold accumulated a vast personal fortune from ivory, rubber and precious commodities 
by using Congolese slave labour. It is estimated that ten million people died from forced 
labour, starvation, and outright extermination during his rule. The Congo was the only 
European colony to run at a profit almost from its inception. In fifteen years, the king, who 
publicly claimed a cumulative loss of $5 million on his Congo enterprises, actually earned 
$25 million in profit. 
In 1908, the Belgian government took over, from King Leopold II, the administration of 
the DRC. Not much changed as far as the maintenance of the Belgians’ grip on, and 
control of, the DRC was concerned. The Belgium colonial government administered the 
DRC from Brussels in alliance with the Catholic Church and mining multinational 
corporations.  Both Leopold II and the colonial government administered the vast DRC 
in a way that not only failed to strengthen state institutions, but that effectively failed to 
build a cohesive society. The colonial government strengthened the exploitative 
tendencies of the King’s administration, for it “practiced exploitation in more regulated 
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forms. It systematized the use of forced labour and cash cropping, and used coercive 
taxation to transform the Congolese peasantry into a wage labour force working for 
Belgian-owned mining and agricultural firms” (Kabemba, 2009:102).   
Encouraged by other African countries that were waging and winning their struggles 
for self-determination and independence, the Congolese were soon to pose a challenge 
to the Belgium colonial establishment with their demand for independence. After riots 
and bloody repressions, Belgium finally conceded to the reality of the demand to grant 
the Congolese self-determination. As such, the Belgians announced, in January 1960, 
that they would grant independence to the DRC within six months, with 30 June 1960 
being the day on which independence was declared (Iyenda, 2005; Kabemba, 2009; 
Lemarchand, 1964).   
The self-determination that was so abruptly granted to the Congolese had its own 
consequences. As has been established before, the colonial project failed to build a 
cohesive state and strong institutions, due, at least in part, to the native Congolese 
hardly being ready to take over from their colonial masters. As Iyenda (2005:11) 
explains: 
At independence, the country had fewer than 10 university graduates. The Congolese 
army, the Force Publique, was more like a police force, to maintain internal law and order 
among the local people. 
Kabemba (2009:102) explains many deficits of the colonial project and the problems 
presented or inherited by the independent state. Just as Iyenda states above, the 
challenges of the independent state ranged from those relating to education and the 
military to a lack of national cohesion. He argues: 
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The instability that plagued the new state from the eve of independence was a direct 
consequence of colonial policies and a lack of preparedness for independence … the Congo 
was expected to build modern state institutions from scratch … for the first years of its 
independence, the Congo remained a country without a single, effective political authority 
to govern it, a situation exacerbated by the lack of trained personnel to run a country. At 
Independence there were less than a dozen Congolese university graduates. In addition the 
newly independent state was under threat from tribal and ethnic conflict, and was built on 
laws which were not adapted to Congolese realities. 
The lack of preparedness presented the newly independent DRC with an overwhelming 
number of challenges. Colonial power in the DRC did not end at independence. What 
largely happened was solely a transfer of political power, with the economy remaining 
in the hands of the colonialists. At independence, Patrice Lumumba, from the 
Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) party, had entered into a political alliance with 
the Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO) party. Joseph Kasavubu became the ceremonial 
President of the DRC, while Lumumba became the first Prime Minister of the country. 
The country was renamed the République du Congo i.e. Republic of the Congo 
(Kisiangani, 2009). When Lumumba attempted to chart a new course towards taking 
economic power, he was overthrown and assassinated, after having been only a few 
months in office. In short, the colonial masters were not prepared to let go 
economically. A Belgian commander is said to have stated that “after independence 
equals before independence” (Kabemba, 2009:103). Roberts (1965:5) diagnosed what 
contributed to Lumumba’s fallout with the Belgians, and his subsequent overthrow and 
assassination. He states: 
… no sooner had Lumumba been elected … [than] Belgium began to take steps to weaken 
his government. The Belgians had forced the Congolese to allow them to maintain an army 
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and air bases in the Congo, ostensibly for ‘mutual cooperation.’ A week after independence, 
when Congolese soldiers demonstrated against their Belgian officers with a demand for 
pay and rank raises, the Belgian troops fired on demonstrators. Lumumba, in turn, 
removed the Belgian officers, and appointed Joseph Kasavubu Commander-in-Chief. The 
Belgians quickly exploited the situation they had provoked … they rushed in new troops, 
and separated Katanga from the Congo Republic – using Moise Tshombe, a wealthy 
plantation owner and businessman as their Katanga front man. 
With Lumumba overthrown and assassinated, Kasavubu took over the running of the 
country and managed, with the help of the United States and the UN, to reincorporate 
the Katanga province that had broken away. Be that as it may, the Kasavubu 
government was not free of political instability. The years that followed were marked 
by political instability, thus providing an enabling environment for the new chapter to 
be launched in 1965 (Iyenda, 2005; Kabemba, 2009; Kisiangani, 2009; Lemarchand, 
1964).  
3.3 The DRC between 1965 and 1997 
By 1965, the Cold War was already at its pinnacle in Africa, with Zaire being no 
exception. Under such conditions, on 24 November 1965, Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu 
came to power through a coup, with the assistance of the United States Central 
Intelligence Agency. The Americans could not allow the DRC to fall to communism, for 
it is strategically located. The fall of the DRC to communism could have meant its 
further advance into central and southern Africa (Kabemba, 2009). Consequently, 
Mobutu was supported, in order to ensure that the country did not lapse into 
communism, but more profoundly to secure the West’s economic strategic interests. As 
Kisiangani (2009:40) explains:  
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Although the justification for support of Mobutu by Western countries is often found in the 
Cold War argument – that the Soviet influence in Africa needed to be checked – it had 
much to do with competition for access to the Congo’s mineral wealth. It is argued that 
Western support for Mobutu was related to his willingness to allow the US and other 
Western multinational corporations access to the Congo’s resources. 
Mobutu ruled Zaire DRC similarly to how King Leopold II had ruled it previously. Both 
men treated the state as an instrument to deliver and to facilitate the accumulation of 
personal wealth. At the time of his rule, almost forty per cent of the DRC national 
revenue was ‘pocketed’ by him and his associates. Life expectancy, by 1994, had fallen 
to 53 years (CCR, 2011; Kabemba, 2009).   
Mobutu consolidated power by eliminating the opposition and institutionalizing 
kleptocracy and dictatorship. In the early 1970s, he nationalised much of the economy and 
changed the name of the country to Zaire – and his own to Mobuto Sese Seko Nkuku 
Ngbendu Wa Za Banga … During Mobutu’s long presidency, Zaire became notorious for 
cronyism and sustained periods of institutionalized corruption and misappropriation of 
state resources. Large proportions of the revenues from state-owned companies were 
diverted to Mobutu and his closest allies. 
(Kisiangani, 2009:40) 
While busy plundering national resources and safeguarding the interests of the West 
that had helped to install him to the helm of looting, Mobutu did not foresee the change 
that awaited him in the near future. However, the early 1990s brought with them an 
important event in the history of the politics of the 20th century – the fall of the Berlin 
Wall (which marked the end of communism) and the spread of liberal democratic ideas. 
Thus, international politics changed in most profound ways. Francis Fukuyama labelled 
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the period ‘the end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1992). Mobutu lost his usefulness for the 
United States and its allies, who were now interested in the democratic project and in 
liberal institutionalism. As Kabemba (2009:104) corroborates:  
With Communism defeated, the strategy of the US changed. An earlier generation of 
African dictators was abandoned in favour of a new generation of leaders who 
accepted the new creed of globalization. Mobutu who had been applauded for 
nationalizing mining companies when he took power in 1965, was asked to embrace 
economic liberalization and privatization. He failed to read the signs of the times and 
was so reluctant to democratize and privatise companies that his allies started to 
consider bringing about a change of regime. 
Mobutu was finally overthrown, in May 1997, by AFDL’s Laurent Kabila. Kabila was 
supported by the West and by such neighbouring countries as Burundi, Uganda and 
Rwanda, which had national security interests in the DRC (Kisiangani, 2009).  
3.4 The DRC conflict (1997–2002) 
3.4.1 The origins of the conflict 
The Rwandan genocide of 1994 features profoundly as one of the contributors to the 
DRC conflict. After the genocide, the perpetrators left Rwanda for exile in eastern DRC, 
where they were housed in United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
camps. The ‘Interahamwe’, as they were known, started reorganising themselves in 
order to launch new attacks on Rwanda, using the refugee camps as incursion bases. 
The Rwandan government then began arming the group called the Banyamulenge, who 
were also in the eastern DRC, to counter the planned attacks of the Interahamwe 
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(Kabemba, 2009). As was the case with Rwanda, Uganda was also concerned with the 
DRC-based rebels who were causing instability in northern Uganda. The Congo  under 
Mobutu thus became a concern to Uganda and Rwanda. Further, the Rwandan 
government sent in troops to counter the planned attacks. This angered Mobutu, who, 
in response, ordered them to leave Zaire. Mobutu’s order intensified hostilities and 
increased the anti-Mobutu sentiments in the country. These sentiments led to the 
formation of the AFDL, with the support of Uganda and Rwanda, under the leadership 
of Laurent Kabila. Uganda and Rwanda preferred Laurent Kabila, because, among 
many other reasons, he was associated with Yoweri Museveni (the Ugandan President), 
through them both having been university students and due to his marriage to a Tutsi 
women (from the tribe of Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda) (Baregu, 2002; 
Iyenda, 2005; Kabemba, 2009; Mwaniki, 2009; Prunier, 2009).  
In addition, Angola also harboured anti-Mobutu sentiments. The Angolan Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government considered the DRC under 
Mobutu as a serious threat to its continued existence, because the Katanga province of 
the DRC served as the training ground for UNITA rebels fighting the Angolan 
government. The AFDL, with the assistance of Rwanda and Uganda, started organising 
themselves to topple the Mobutu government. They then started taking over towns and 
cities, such as Kisangani and Lubumbashi, until they finally captured the capital city, 
Kinshasa, on 17 May 1997. After overthrowing Mobutu, Kabila changed the name of the 
country from Zaire (which it had been named by Mobutu) to the DRC. While charting 
his way to Kinshasa, Kabila had made several concessions to various multinational 
mining companies, including Anglo-American, Texaf, George Forest International, 
American Mineral Fields, and others. Once in power, Kabila had given influential 
governmental positions to Rwandese nationals, including James Kabarebe (Chief of 
Staff of the Congolese Armed Forces), Bizima Karaha (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Deo 
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Bugera (Minister of State and Secretary-General of the AFDL), Moise Nyarugabo (Chief 
Executive Officer of the Acquired Goods Office), and Michael Rudatenguha (Financial 
Director in the President’s Office). Such deals and decisions, as well as his failure to 
fulfil his democratisation promise, led to dissent and disappointment with his 
government (Baregu, 2002; Iyenda, 2005; Kabemba, 2009; Mwaniki, 2009; Prunier: 2009).   
In 1998, on suspicion that the Rwandese he appointed were planning to overthrow him, 
and seemingly in an attempt to appease the Congolese, Kabila ordered the Rwandese 
and Ugandan forces and personnel to leave the country. This order, which was harshly 
accepted by those on the receiving end, led to mutinies in the army, particularly in 
Kinshasa and in the eastern province of Kivu. Whereas the mutiny in Kinshasa was 
halted, the one in the eastern province continued, culminating in a drive to topple the 
government. In the same eastern province, the Banyamulenge formed the Rally for 
Congolese Democracy (RCD) and swiftly gained control of such towns as Bukavu and 
Uvira, and many of the eastern provinces. The RCD based their operation in the city of 
Goma. By that time, Kabila’s relation with the allies that had brought him to power had 
already soured. Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda retaliated by occupying parts of the 
eastern and north-eastern parts of the DRC. At the same time, Uganda ‘engineered’ a 
rebel group, called the Movement for Liberation of the Congo (MLC). Seeing that the 
anti-Kabila rebel forces were advancing towards Kinshasa, President Kabila appealed 
for assistance from SADC. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia sent troops to aid the 
Kabila government. By August 1998, the conflict had culminated in outright war, 
involving more than seven African countries. This war had been referred to by many as 
‘Africa’s First World War’ (Baregu, 2002; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 
2009; Iyenda, 2005; Kabemba, 2009; Kisiangani, 2009; Mwaniki, 2009; Naidoo, 2000).  
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3.4.2 Namibian intervention in the conflict 
As was already stated, Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe joined the war in the DRC after 
the Rwandan and Ugandan supported rebel forces captured most of the towns and 
headed towards Kinshasa. Kabila appealed to these countries in the name of SADC. On 
7 and 8 August 1998, President Mugabe, the then chairman of the OPDS, convened a 
meeting in Victoria Falls to discuss the DRC conflict. The meeting was attended by 
Namibia, Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, the DRC and Zimbabwe. The meeting agreed to 
set up a verification committee of Foreign Ministers of Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. The committee was tasked with investigating the nature of the conflict, and 
thereafter proposing peace recommendations (Meyns, 2002). President Mugabe called 
for a follow-up meeting, which was held in Harare on 18 August 1998. This meeting 
was a special meeting of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) 
Defence Ministers, which was held to consider the findings of the verification 
committee. Following the findings of the verification committee, the meeting resolved 
that those SADC members that were able to, had to give assistance to President Kabila, 
for it was found that Uganda and Rwanda had violated the sovereignty of the DRC. 
SADC allies’ intervention was also found legitimate in terms of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, which provides for a state’s individual or collective self-defence, should such a 
scenario manifest itself (Meyns, 2002; Punungwe, 1999). 
3.4.2.1 Joining the war – economic motives or defending DRC sovereignty? 
There is a vast amount of literature on the exploitation of the resources of the DRC by 
the parties involved in that particular conflict. Many argue that all the external forces 
(Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Namibia, Angola, and Zimbabwe) had ulterior motives to 
that of coming to the aid of the Kabila government (specifically with reference to the 
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SADC allies). Such clandestine motives have largely been documented as being of an 
economic nature. The official version of Namibia’s motive was provided by the 
Namibian Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Namibian Defence Force 
(NDF), President Nujoma, as quoted in Orogun (2002:36–37), qualifying Namibia’s 
intervention as follows: 
Our troops are there to safeguard Namibia's future security. We should not behave like 
children and delude ourselves in thinking that the peace and stability that we are enjoying 
today will remain forever. As the Commander-in Chief, I took the necessary action to come 
to the aid of an aggressed neighbour and fellow member of SADC. I did so conscious of the 
inherent dangers and problems including the death of our troops. It is an honourable act of 
enlightened self-interests. The very worst was in store for us. 
Lumb (1999) adds that:  
The NDF envisaged the DRC campaign to be a short to medium term operation comprised 
of two phases. The objective of phase one was to protect the Kabila government in Kinshasa 
and prevent it from being overthrown by rebel forces, as well as to secure the western 
economic corridor, Kinshasa's vital link to the Atlantic Ocean … Phase two's objective was 
to contain the rebel forces in the eastern region of the DRC and prevent them capturing 
towns and other strategic areas. 
The internationalisation of the DRC conflict also meant that the UN and the Security 
Council would also intervene in the conflict. One of the UN interventions was the 
establishment of a panel of experts to investigate the illegal exploitation of resources in 
the DRC. The panel was known as The Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of 
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo. On 
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16 April 2001, the Panel published its report, which identified those that had been 
involved in plundering the resources of the DRC.  
According to Iyenda (2002:15–16), it was also found that:  
… foreign forces allied with the Congolese government, namely Angola, Namibia and 
especially Zimbabwe, were also profiting from the conflict through economic deals and 
agreements, exploitation of mines and one-sided contracts on several goods and 
merchandises.” 
The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (1998:8) states:  
… some observers suggest that Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia each has its own reasons 
for intervening. Zimbabwe and Namibia have economic interests in the DRC that they wish 
to defend, safeguard and promote. 
According to Taylor and Williams (2001:276): 
Namibia’s $25 million trade deal with Kabila, which stands to benefit key players 
associated with the Nujoma regime, similarly played a role in Windhoek’s decision to enter 
and remain involved in the war. 
Orogun (2002:36) believes that Namibia’s intervention in the DRC is based on “political 
and core economic expediency rather than sheer altruism”. He argues that Namibia, 
much of which is a dry country, was interested in using the Congo River as a water 
resource. As such, the intervention could “secure economic and vital resource benefits”. 
Orogun’s (2002) observation corresponds with what President Nujoma had to say, 
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especially in regards to Namibian troops being there “to safeguard Namibia's future 
security” and also that the intervention was “an honourable act of enlightened self-
interests”. 
The argument as to the motives of Namibia is neither here nor there. It is, indeed, 
possible that Namibia partook, and was interested, in plundering the resources of the 
DRC, and that the intervention was an act of “enlightened self-interest”. There seems to 
be evidence on both sides. It is very clear that both Angola and Zimbabwe were 
involved in plundering the DRC’s resources. The UN Panel, for example, provided 
details of the specific involvement of the two countries, and the shares held, as well as 
in which sector and industry. Compared to the available information on Angola and 
Zimbabwe, there is little precise information available on Namibia’s looting and 
plundering of the DRC resources. However, it is interesting to note the ‘$25 million 
trade deal’ that Namibia had with Kabila, as covered by Taylor and Williams (2001). 
The possibility also exists that the money involved is that which is referred to in the 
following: “during the time when Namibia became involved in the DRC conflict in 
1998, Namibia granted DRC a loan of N$ 25 million” (Mushelenga, 2008:131). 
According to the International Crisis Group (1999:10),  
… there are few reasons for the continued military involvement of Namibia in the DRC. 
The Namibian involvement can only be explained in terms of the warm relationship 
between Namibian President Sam Nujoma, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and 
Kabila. The friendship between Nujoma and Mugabe started in their early days as freedom 
fighters against white minority rule in their countries. Nujoma and Kabila used to belong to 
informal Marxist discussion groups in Dar Es Salaam, where they were exiled in 1960’s. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
          
 
60 
In addition, Prunier (2009:265) states: “Windhoek had joined [the DRC conflict] only 
because [of] the SADC big boy pressure.” 
In the light of the above, De Carvalho (2010:38) summarises the situation as being one in 
which  
… the international community has not slated the former [Namibia] over the plunder of 
Congolese resources, as was the case with Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. The riches 
gained by Namibia from the DRC were granted by the DRC government in compensation 
for Namibian spending in the conflict. Therefore, with or without the business issue, 
Namibia was already inclined to support Kabila. 
3.4.2.2 Joining the war – the domestic debate 
Joining the war in the DRC was a contested phenomenon not only in SADC, but also 
inside Namibia. This contention was especially profound in the National Assembly, 
Namibia’s legislative body. Mushelenga (2008:131) captures this debate as follows: 
[Namibia’s] involvement in the DRC … has created controversy in foreign policy-making. 
The manner in which information on Namibia’s involvement in the DRC conflict was 
communicated to the public does not augur well for foreign policy-making. When the issue 
came, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, denied that Namibia has sent 
troops to the DRC, only for President Nujoma to confirm this state of affairs within two 
days. Accordingly, an opposition politician, Moses Katjiuongua questioned the granting to 
the DRC, during the conflict, of a loan of N$ 25 million. This issue … has created a 
controversy in Namibia’s foreign policy-making. 
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Other arguments that were advanced by the opposition and the media were that 
President Nujoma had bypassed Parliament and had acted alone in sending troops to 
the DRC. The resultant confusion even created the belief, in some lawmakers, that a 
violation of the Namibian Constitution had taken place. Of these, Elizabeth Amukugo, a 
member of the main opposition party at the time, the Congress of Democrats (CoD), 
was quoted in Mushelenga (2008) stating that the:  
… involvement in the DRC conflict and Angola was not consistent with the policy of non-
alignment or international settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. Since the 
fighting in the DRC was not a secret war, it was beyond our comprehension that the 
decision was taken to get involved secretly without informing Parliament or even 
informing the public whose tax money had to be spent without their authorization.  
(Mushelenga, 2008:128) 
However, Lumb (1999) clarifies this matter as follows: 
Section 29 of the Defence Amendment Act (No. 114 of 1990) stipulates the circumstances in 
which members of the NDF can be deployed on foreign soil, but the Constitution is silent as 
to who has the authority to make such a decision. In reality this means that the President 
has the discretion to declare war and send soldiers to another country without consulting 
the legislature prior to the decision. As a consequence of this Constitutional provision, 
President Nujoma circumvented the National Assembly when he made the decision to 
deploy troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
Mushelenga (2008:128–129) also corroborates this view, stating that: 
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… members of the opposition parties misunderstood constitutional provisions regarding 
Parliament’s approval of martial laws. The relevance of the opposition arguments in this 
respect is applicable only when martial laws and state of emergency are applied in case of 
civil war or threat to constitutional order, peace and stability … Article 27 of the Namibian 
Constitution requires the President to consult the National Assembly only when declaring 
the public emergency, state of national defence and martial law, in the event of threat to 
national defence and security due to either civil war or threat by another state … The 
Namibian Constitution is silent on the issue of deploying the NDF to defend another state 
from aggression. 
It is very important to note the words of the President, as a principal foreign policy 
maker, as quoted earlier. That considered it would appear that Namibia went to the 
DRC to respond to President Kabila’s plea. However, this does not mean that it was 
blind of the economic and strategic self interest as stated by the President. Chapter 5 
will carry out a more lucid analysis on this issue.  
3.4.2.3 The role of Namibia in the conflict in the DRC  
The role played by Namibia in the DRC was twofold: firstly, a military role, and 
secondly, a diplomatic role. The military role refers to the actions and results brought 
about by military intervention in the conflict, whereas the diplomatic role refers to the 
actions and results of Namibian political leaders’ efforts to have the conflict resolved.  
3.4.2.3.1 The military role 
Namibia sent about 2 000 troops and about 20 tons of military weapons and other 
supplies to the DRC. The NDF, with the support of the allies, managed to secure 
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Kinshasa, and prevented it from being captured by the rebels. According to the 
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (1998:8), “without the intervention 
of…Namibia, Kinshasa would have been captured by the rebels”. Specifically, it was 
also the responsibility of the NDF to provide for the personal security of President 
Kabila. In addition to safeguarding the city and its airport, the NDF also managed to 
secure the DRC’s strategic link to the Atlantic Ocean, the western economic corridor. 
The force also controlled the western part of the DRC, causing the rebels to withdraw, 
and to cross the Congo River into Congo-Brazzaville. As a result, Namibia and its allies 
brought about a stalemate, which can arguably be said to have decreased the number of 
war mortalities (Cornwell & Potgieter, 1998; Lumb, 1999; Orogun, 2002). 
3.4.2.3.2 The diplomatic role  
The other significant role that was played by Namibia was of a diplomatic nature. 
Before the military intervention, Namibia was already involved in diplomatic attempts 
to find a solution to the conflict. Namibia was chosen, together with Tanzania, 
Zimbabwe and Zambia, to be part of the verification committee tasked with assessing 
the disposition of the conflict and with thereafter making recommendations for its 
peaceful resolution. This verification committee was established by the SADC OPDS 
meeting that took place on 7 and 8 August 1998 (Meyns, 2002; Punungwe, 1999).  
Even after joining the war, Namibia remained committed to the diplomatic resolution of 
the conflict. As Lumb (1999) validates: 
By late-March 1999, President Nujoma readily admitted that this war could not be won 
militarily, and favoured a negotiated settlement instead … By September, after several 
months of intensive diplomatic bargaining, a cease-fire agreement [the Lusaka peace 
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agreement] was eventually signed by most of the important parties. This cease-fire 
agreement stipulates that all foreign troops, including the approximately 2 000 NDF soldiers, 
must withdraw from DRC territory by February 2000. 
The allies’ intervention caused a stir in SADC, adding on to the already existing 
differences between President Mugabe (Chair of SADC OPDS) and President Mandela 
(Chair of SADC) at the time. It appeared that there were differences and conflicting 
views on how best the conflict could be resolved, although there was consensus that 
President Kabila was the legitimate authority in the DRC whose territorial integrity and 
sovereignty was to be respected. The allies, led by SADC OPDS’s Chair, felt that 
providing military aid to fellow SADC members whose sovereignty was being violated 
by foreign aggressors was apt; while the SADC Chair saw peaceful means, rather than 
military intervention, as the way forward (Meyns, 2002).  
In the light of the above, President Nujoma played an enormous role in reconciling 
these divergent views and in shaping the direction of events, based not on condemning 
the allies, but on supporting their intervention as a basis of the roadmap. Specifically, 
President Nujoma managed to convince President Mandela, the SADC Chair, to 
support the allies’ intervention in the DRC. President Mandela was quoted in Cornwell 
& Potgieter (1998) as stating: 
“It is quite reasonable when the legitimate head of a government of a country says: ‘I have 
been invaded by a foreign force. Come and help me defend my country ...…’ for the 
neighbouring country to respond positively …… There was some confusion before. But once 
Sam Nujoma gave me this explanation and he repeated it in the summit, we unanimously 
supported that initiative and expressly acknowledged President Kabila as the legitimate 
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head of that government. There is no difference whatsoever on this point now that 
explanations have been given.” 
(Cornwell & Potgieter: 1998,78). 
As such, it is no surprise that the SADC Annual Summit, which was held in Grand Baie 
from 13 to 14 September 1998 gave its blessing to the intervention of the allies. The 
summit statement read: 
“The Summit welcomed initiatives by SADC and its Member States intended to assist in the 
restoration of peace, security and stability in DRC, in particular the Victoria Falls and 
Pretoria initiatives. In that regard, the Summit reaffirmed its call for an immediate cessation 
of hostilities and commended the Governments of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe for 
timorously providing troops to assist the Government and people of the DRC defeat the 
illegal attempt by rebels and their allies to capture the capital city, Kinshasa, and other 
strategic areas.” 
 (SADC,: 1998) 
3.4.3 The DRC conflict resolution process  
Before the intervention of the allies in the DRC, there was considerable propensity to 
resolve the DRC conflict, as evidenced by the meeting that was held at an early stage in 
Victoria Falls involving the belligerents. SADC continued with efforts to resolve the 
conflict. With the passage of time, this protracted international conflict became of 
greater concern to the international community than it had been earlier on. It is for this 
reason that both the OAU and the UN were involved at the highest level.  
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In 1999, SADC tasked the late Zambian President, Frederick Chiluba, with facilitating 
dialogue between the warring parties. This culminated in the signing of the Lusaka 
Peace Agreement between Namibia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Angola, and the 
DRC on 10 July 1999. In addition, the Agreement was also signed by the RCD and the 
MLC, being the two rebel formations, two months later. The Lusaka Peace Agreement 
called, amongst others, for a ceasefire in the DRC; the establishment of a unified army 
and joint military commission to tackle disarmaments of armed groups; the withdrawal 
of all foreign forces from the DRC; the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force to 
safeguard the implementation of the agreement; and an all-inclusive political dialogue – 
the Inter-Congolese Dialogue – to bring about a new political dispensation in the DRC. 
The Dialogue was to be initiated by a neutral facilitator chosen, in consultation with the 
belligerents, by the OAU (of which the former President of Botswana, Sir Katumile 
Masire, subsequently became the facilitator). 
All did not go according to plan, for there was still divergent interest and mistrust 
among parties, although they had signed the Lusaka Peace Agreement. Fighting started 
again in the DRC, prompting the UN, in February 2000, to deploy more than 5 000 
troops to monitor the ceasefire. President Kabila was also said to be indifferent to the 
facilitator, President Masire. On 17 January 2001, President Kabila was assassinated and 
his son, Joseph Kabila, was unanimously elected by Parliament to be his father’s 
successor. The young Kabila showed considerable inclination to peace and resolution of 
the conflict in his country, with the peace talks beginning to take shape in the early 
2000s.  
The Inter-Congolese Dialogue involved lengthy talks, including agreements, 
disagreements, protests, deals and boycotts. This was the most important part of 
peacemaking in the DRC. The facilitator tried to hold a meeting between the parties in 
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Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, but the talks failed when the participants could not agree on the 
inclusion and exclusion of delegates. Between February and  April 2002, About 360 
delegates later converged on Sun City, South Africa, as part of the Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue. The Sun City Talks led to the signing of a peace deal between Rwanda and 
the DRC on 30 July 2002, which called for the withdrawal of Rwandan soldiers from the 
DRC and the dismantling of the Rwanda-supported rebel forces.  
A month later, on 6 September 2002, the Luanda peace agreement was signed between 
the DRC and Uganda. The agreement directed Uganda to withdraw her troops from the 
DRC, while calling for improved relations between the two countries. The Inter- 
Congolese Dialogue finally made a breakthrough on 17 December 2002, when the 
Global and All-Inclusive Agreement was signed by all the parties that had been present 
at the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, including the DRC national government, the MLC, the 
RCD, the Rally for Congolese Democracy – Liberation Movement (RCD-ML), the Rally 
for Congolese Democracy – National (RCD-N), opposition parties, civil society 
organisations, and the Mai Mai. The Global and All-Inclusive Agreement outlined the 
path for the future which included, amongst others, the establishment of a transitional 
government and legislative and Presidential elections (Apuuli, 2004; Iyenda, 2005; 
Kisiangani, 2009; Meyns, 2002). 
There is little mention of the role of Namibia during the conflict resolution process 
although the country took part in SADC efforts to resolve the conflict. It must be noted, 
however, that the then Namibian Ambassador to the UN, Martin Andjaba, did form 
part of the MONUC team sent to the DRC by the Security Council (UN, 2000). 
Namibia’s main contribution to this conflict resolution process appears to be the 
withdrawal of troops from the DRC, according to the schedule of the Lusaka 
Agreement,  to allow for the Inter Congolese Dialogue to take effect. In discussing the 
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importance of the Inter Congolese Dialogue in one of the sessions of the Security 
Council, Jamaican Ambassador, Curtis Ward, thanked Namibia for withdrawing, by the 
end of August, from the DRC (ReliefWeb, 2001). The former UN Secretary-General, Kofi 
Annan was also reported to have “applauded the withdrawal of Namibian troops last 
month from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a positive sign for the peace 
process after three years of conflict” (IRIN , 2001).   
Namibia’s ‘laid back’ approach during the conflict resolution process can be best 
understood in the words of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hidipo Hamutenya, 
who then remarked that “with the Rwanda and Uganda aggression blunted and their 
hegemonic ambitions checked, it was now possible for other parties, such as the UN 
and South Africa, to step forth with proposals for peacekeeping and national 
reconciliation ” (Dzinesa &  Rupiya: 2005,225). From the above, it appears clear that 
Namibia regarded conflict resolutions and post-conflict reconstruction as the business 
of others such as South Africa. 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
The ending of the DRC conflict finally closed the devastating century-old chapter in the 
history of the DRC. From the plundering, exploitation and underdevelopment of King 
Leopold, Mobutu and the likes, the DRC can now look forward, with determination and 
focus, to the humane development of its people. This, however, does not mean that we 
can forget the history of ‘peace-less’ DRC.  
The current chapter provided a descriptive account of the role of Namibia in a highly 
internationalised conflict that saw about eight African countries fighting one another on 
African soil. While Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and their rebel creations were fighting to 
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topple the Kabila government, Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe fought to prevent the 
overthrow of the Kabila government. Chad and Sudan are said to have been part of the 
conflict as well. It is the above phenomenon that led scholars to describe this event as 
‘Africa’s First World War’. With the efforts of the UN, OAU and SADC in particular, the 
conflict was finally resolved, even though it was a lengthy process that required 
diligence and commitment from those tasked with the responsibility of bringing the 
belligerent forces together.   
There is a large body of literature providing evidence that the war had a dimension of 
looting the DRC resources by those involved. The UN constituted a panel of experts to 
investigate the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC. The findings of 
the panel, which were released in 2001, affirm that plundering of natural resources from 
the Congo did, indeed, take place. The panel report and scholars in the field found 
Zimbabwe, Uganda and Rwanda mostly guilty of having plundered the resources of 
the DRC. Namibia is mentioned as being part of the group, but there was little mention 
of specific looting and plundering activities, as was the case with her allies. The study 
does not, however, conclude that Namibia did not take part in the plundering of the 
DRC resources – it is possible that Namibia did take part in the plundering of the 
resources – but that there is little specific and lucid indication of such.  
Namibia, which played a crucial role in the DRC conflict, and her allies swiftly moved 
into the DRC and managed to secure Kinshasa, which was about to be captured by the 
rebel forces. There is wide consensus that, if it had not been for the SADC allies coming 
to Kabila’s aid, Kinshasa would have been captured by the rebels and the Kabila 
government overthrown (Lumb, 1999). Namibia also gave 20 tons of weapons and other 
supplies, and a loan of N$25 million, to the DRC government at the time of war.  
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Apart from the military role that Namibia played, it also played an important role at the 
diplomatic level. Before deploying its troops, Namibia partook in SADC discussions 
aimed at resolving the DRC conflict. Namibia’s Foreign Minister served on the 
verification committee set up to study the nature of the DRC conflict, and to make 
recommendations to the OPDS. The talks and efforts paved the way for the signing of 
the Lusaka Agreement, which not only called for a cessation of hostilities, but also 
called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the deployment of the UN 
peacekeeping forces to oversee the agreement. There were differences among SADC 
members with regard to the intervention. President Nujoma played a crucial role in 
reconciling the views, until SADC endorsed the allies’ intervention in mapping the way 
towards the negotiated settlement of the conflict, culminating in the signing of the 2002 
Global and All-Inclusive Agreement by all domestic political forces in the DRC.  
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CHAPTER FOUR – NAMIBIA IN THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT, COMBATING THE 
COMMON ENEMY? 
4.1 Introduction 
Found on the Atlantic coast of south-west Africa, Angola is a natural-resources- 
endowed southern African country that occupies approximately 1 246 700 square 
kilometres. Populated with more than 14 million people, Angola was a former colony of 
Portugal. The Portuguese explorers first came to Angola in 1483. Their conquest and 
exploitation became concrete when Paulo Dias de Novais erected a colonial settlement 
in Luanda in 1575. By the time that the 1880s Berlin conference apportioned Angola to 
Portugal, the Portuguese had already established themselves in Angola. They made 
sure that they not only destroyed the kingdoms existing there at the time, as a basis of 
the social, political and economic organisation of Angolan society, but they pitted 
various kingdoms against one another too. The indigenous groups launched brave 
resistance against the Portuguese from the 1500s to the 1900s, with the Portuguese 
finally gaining full military control of the whole of Angola, thus effectively imposing 
and enforcing their colonial policy on those living in the country (Birmingham, 1966; De 
Andrede, 1982; Heywood, 1987; Malaquias, 2007; Pitcher, 1991).  
This chapter discusses the Angolan conflict which caused more than 700 000 war-
related deaths and was responsible for more than 400 000 Angolans having to seek 
refuge in neighbouring countries. The same conflict caused tremendous damage to the 
Angolan rural life, thus leading to one of the highest urbanisation rates to be 
experienced in Africa (Hodges, 2001; Malaquias, 2007). The conflict started as a battle to 
capture state power, after Portugal granted independence to Angola in 1975. The 
nationalist movements were largely distinct as well as antagonistic from and towards 
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one another respectively. The protracted conflict came to an end in February 2002, when 
the UNITA rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi, was assassinated. 
In this chapter, particular attention is directed to the role that Namibia played in the 
conflict, after discussing the conflict itself. The role of Namibia cannot be fully 
understood without understanding the conflict, both in its historicity and during the 
period when post-independence Namibia became involved in it.  
4.2 The Angolan conflict 
4.2.1 The bloody race towards 11 November and the 1991 Bicesse Accord  
As is characteristic of colonialism, exploitation, subjugation, segregation and 
assimilation characterised Portuguese colonial policy. By the 1930s to the 1940s most 
Angolans were already socially and politically engaged in the colonial exploitative 
question and the associated way forward. Such engagement was more profound in the 
urban areas of the country. As such, several social, sports and cultural groups started 
coordinating regarding the need for, and manner of, spearheading the anti-colonial 
resistance. Of these, the African National League (LNA) and the Association of Natives 
of Angola (ANANGOLA) were chiefly instrumental in facilitating the anti-colonial 
resistance discourses. By the late 1950s, the groups had emerged with a political and 
nationalist character, which, subsequently, led to the start of the armed anti-colonial 
struggle in 1961. In 1974, fortunately for the nationalists concerned, a coup occurred in 
Portugal that saw the custodianship of the colonial project in Angola overthrown. The 
new regime that took control of the country was not committed to the project. 
Consequently, colonialism and anti-colonial resistance came to an end in Angola 
(Hodges, 2001; Malaquias, 2007). 
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In Portugal, January 1975, the MPLA, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola 
(FNLA) and UNITA signed the Alvor Accord, which provided a transitional roadmap 
towards the independence date of 11 November 1975. Due to the antagonistic factors, 
which are elaborated below, the Alvor Accord lost its meaning, for those who were 
involved in the nationalist movement all went their separate ways, with the intensions 
all aiming at capturing power come 11 November 1975. The antagonistic factors were 
the root cause of the conflict. The Angolan nationalist movements were largely 
fragmented, and could not agree on who should take over state power in post-colonial 
Angola. The movements developed as distinct, sharing neither a joint perspective nor 
identities; they all had differing ethnic origins and foreign backers, and saw one another 
as obstacles that must be removed for each to assume power (Comerford, 2005; Hodges, 
2001; Malaquias, 2007; Mills, 2009). Hodges (2001) explains how distinctive the 
nationalist movements were: 
[The] MPLA was founded in Luanda in 1956 and drew its support mainly from the 
Mbundu, the country’s second largest ethnic group. [It] was heavily influenced by Marxist 
ideas … [and] received arms and diplomatic assistance from the USSR [Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics] and other soviet bloc countries from the 1960s. FNLA [drew its support 
from] the Bakongo – populated extreme north-west … The Bakongo are Angola’s third 
largest ethnic group and also constitute a large part of the population of neighbouring 
Congo and Democratic Republic of Congo … FNLA waged a low-key guerrilla war in 
north-western Angola, backed up from its bases in Zaire, where it enjoyed the support of 
the former dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko … UNITA came into being in 1966. It had very little 
external support and concentrated on building up an underground political movement 
among the Ovimbundu, who, despite constituting Angola’s largest ethnic group, had not 
been mobilized to any significant extent by either MPLA or FNLA. 
(Hodges: 2001,89) 
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It was for the above different interests, that when 11 November arrived, the country 
was largely divided up, with each of the movements controlling their part of the 
country. Hodges (2001:10) effectively captures the race towards 11 November between 
the Angola nationalist movements and their respective allies in the following 
description: 
South Africa, which pursued a classic ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy by forging an alliance with 
UNITA and the FNLA, invaded southern Angola in August 1975 and, by October, had 
advanced more than half way up to the Angolan coast to within 200 km of Luanda. The 
Zairean army invaded in the north, in support of the FNLA. The United States meanwhile 
provided covert support to both UNITA and the FNLA, to counter-balance soviet military 
assistance to the MPLA. In response to South African invasion, Cuba sent troops to Angola, 
from October 1975. This ensured that, when independence was formally declared in 
November, the MPLA was in control of the capital, where it proclaimed a ‘people’s 
republic’ and appointed its leader Agostino Neto, as President. Over the following few 
months, the Cuban helped the MPLA to secure control over the whole country. The US 
intervention halted, following the passage of Clark Amendment, which barred support for 
any of the Angolan factions … This left the South African government in the lurch, forcing 
it to withdraw its forces back across the border into northern Namibia in 1976. 
Malaquias (2007) corroborates what Hodges (2001) has to say, stating:    
At independence Angola had essentially three governments: MPLA backed by Cuban 
troops controlled Luanda, the capital, and little else; UNITA controlled Huambo, the 
second largest city and several southern provinces with South African help while FNLA, 
supported by Zairean troops, held the northern provinces. 
(Malaquias, 2007:39) 
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The fighting did not end after the weakening of UNITA, the withdrawal of South Africa 
or the Clark Amendment that barred the United States supporting any Angolan 
belligerents. FNLA was virtually destroyed in the bloody race towards 11 November, 
thereafter, UNITA begun to reorganise. UNITA’s leader, Jonas Savimbi, managed to 
establish good relations with Zaire, for the latter allowed UNITA to establish bases for 
its guerrilla activities. South Africa renewed its support of UNITA, as well as actively 
taking part in the military offensives. The apartheid regime launched numerous 
military operations in Angola; all stemming from what it termed a ‘total strategy’ that 
was the regime’s response to what it perceived as a ‘communist onslaught’ in the 
region. It launched such operations as ‘Operation Skeptic’, ‘Operation Protea’ and 
‘Operation Daisy’, which all included support for UNITA and an attack on the 
‘communists’ (South West African People’s Organisation [SWAPO], the African 
National Congress [ANC] and the MPLA, keeping in mind that the ANC and SWAPO 
had a presence in Angola). The repeal of the Clark Amendment, in July 1985, also saw 
the United States resuming its support of UNITA. As happened in the race towards 
November 11, the Soviets and the Cubans came to the aid of the MPLA. Cuba thus 
maintained about 50 000 ground troops in the country. What followed subsequently 
was protracted fighting (Grobbelaar, Mills & Sidiropoulos, 2003; Hodges, 2001; 
Malaquias, 2007; Mills, 2009).    
The MPLA and its allies (Cuba, the ANC and SWAPO) met, at the confrontational 
decisive battle of Cuito Cuanavale, against UNITA and the South African forces. After 
the battle, the belligerent forces agreed to the cessation of fighting and allowed for the 
implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 435, which led 
to the withdrawal of the Cuban troops and paved the way for Namibia’s independence. 
As a result, UNITA and the ruling MPLA signed the Bicesse peace agreement in 1991 
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(Anstee, 1996; Comerford, 2005; Grobbelaar et al., 2003; Hodges, 2001; Malaquias, 2007; 
Mills, 2009; Prunier, 2009).  
4.2.2 The 1990s abortive peace deals 
The late 1980s and the early 1990s were to be decisive in the political dynamics of the 
conflict. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and apartheid to follow suit, there was a 
greater propensity towards peace and negotiations to end the Angolan conflict. As such, 
negotiations took place between the MPLA government and UNITA in Portugal, which 
led to the signing in May 1991, of the Bicesse Accord between the two antagonists. The 
Bicesse Accord provided for a ceasefire; the quartering of UNITA troops; the 
establishment of unified armed forces; surplus troop demobilisation; the restoration of 
government administration in the UNITA stronghold; and multi-party parliamentary 
and presidential elections.  
This process was to be overseen by the joint politico-military commission, with the 
support of the UN through UNAVEM II. As expected, the United States, Portugal and 
the USSR played a role in the process, due to their linkages to the conflict (with Portugal 
as the former coloniser, the USSR as the supporter of the MPLA, and the United States 
as the forerunner of the peace deal and the former backer of UNITA). The election, 
which was held in September 1992, were won by the MPLA, and declared by the UN to 
have been free and fair. When UNITA refused to accept the election results, Angola was 
launched into war once again (Hodges, 2001; Malaquias, 2007).   
When UNITA returned to war after the 1992 elections, it no longer enjoyed the support 
of its former allies, apart from Zaire. UNITA, however, managed to fund its war from 
the returns that it earned from the diamonds in the areas under its grip. Several UN 
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sanctions left Jonas Savimbi with no choice but to agree to the new peace deal – the 
Lusaka Protocol. This peace agreement embodied the attributes of the Bicesse Accord, 
but also included new measures such as power-sharing and the prioritisation of the 
military settlement before elections. The agreement was signed on 21 November 1994. 
As a result, the UN deployed about 7 000 troops under UNAVEM III. However, since 
UNITA totally flouted the Lusaka Protocol, it was never implemented. After several 
years of fighting, President dos Santos, after the December 1999 MPLA congress, 
terminated the Lusaka peace process, called for UN withdrawal, and directed the 
Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) to launch a total offensive against UNITA (Hodges, 2001; 
Malaquias, 2007). UNITA, without its allies and together with the sanctions that were 
imposed on it, could no longer resist the FAA offensive. UNITA’s leader, Savimbi, was 
subsequently assassinated, marking the resumption of peace, national reconciliation 
and reconstruction, and development.  
Grobbelaar et al. (2003:8) summarise their overview of this period as follows: 
Jonas Savimbi’s death on 22 February 2002 provided the decisive factor that ended the 
conflict. It resulted in the signing of a truce between the surviving military leaders of 
UNITA and the MPLA government on 4 April 2002 in Luanda. The pace of political change 
and military demobilization since then has been breathtaking. By early August 2002, the 
process of quartering UNITA soldiers and their families had officially been concluded, with 
more than 80 000 soldiers (35 000 more than initially expected) and around 260 000 family 
members involved. 
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4.2.3 The role of Namibia 
The war in Angola was not only a national security concern to Namibia, but it had a 
history behind it, the Namibian ruling party, SWAPO,  had historical links with the 
MPLA, having fought together against the same opponent (UNITA) before Namibia 
gained independence. The conflict in Angolan can be regarded as somewhat of an 
unfinished business for the ruling SWAPO and the MPLA. The two parties fought 
against UNITA before Namibia’s Independence (Dzinesa & Rupiya, 2005). This study 
does not trace the historic role of Namibia before independence, but concerns the role of 
post-independence Namibia in the Angolan conflict between 1994 and 2002. 
4.2.3.1 Role under the UN 
The first role of Namibia was part of various UN missions in the region, starting in the 
mid-1990s.   
[Namibia] participated in the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) 
in 1996 and has been rotated two times since its deployment there. Although the UN Plan 
called for the withdrawal of all military contingents by the end of February 1997, the 
Namibian contingent was requested by the UN to stay on up to August 1997. The 
government accepted the UN request and a replacement force was selected, prepared and 
dispatched in March 1997. [The] mission with UNAVEM III has been changed from road 
verification and VIP escort to that of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). The contingent 
continued to serve with the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) at the 
request of the UN after UNAVEM III was terminated. Its duty in Angola ended in February 
1999. 
(MoD, 2000)  
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The above is corroborated by Dzinesa & Rupiya (2005:222) who present that “ the NDF 
also contributed personnel to serve on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission 
(UNAVEM) III in 1996. UN Security Council Resolution 976 of 8 February 1995 
established the multidimensional UNAVEM III to assist the government and UNITA in 
restoring peace and achieving national reconciliation against a fragile politico-military 
background. Initially assigned road verification and VIP escort duties, the UNAVEM 
Namibian contingent was later asked to act as a Rapid Reaction Force. The NDF 
contingent continued to serve with the smaller United Nations Observer Mission for 
Angola (MONUA), which replaced UNAVEM III on 30 June 1997.”  
Namibia also took part in various diplomatic regional meetings on the conflict. As Jere 
(2001) reported, “Presidents Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, Sam Nujoma of 
Namibia and Frederick Chiluba of Zambia held a one-day mini-summit to discuss the 
security situation along their shared borders and concluded that Savimbi was blocking 
the end of Angola's civil war…The heads of state condemned UNITA ... for its 
intransigence and failure to implement the obligations it freely subscribed to and 
embodied in the 1994 Lusaka Protocol," said a communique issued after several hours 
of talks… The three leaders Tuesday called upon the international community, and in 
particular African countries, "to abide by and enhance" existing UN Security Council 
sanctions against UNITA, which ban its trade in diamonds and limit travel by its 
leaders.[the three head of state had  earlier] agreed to set up the body mainly to address 
Luanda's fears that Angolan UNITA rebels could launch attacks from neighboring 
states.” At one point, the then  UN Secretary General Special Envoy to Angola, Issa 
Diallo, who was scheduled to meet Savimbi, was reported to have “paid a courtesy call 
on President Sam Nujoma in Windhoek to seek advice on the critical situation in 
Angola” for he believed that doing so was “a positive step towards the peace process” 
(PANA, 1998).  
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4.2.3.2 Military role 
Apart from its role under the UN banner, the NDF was an integral part of the conflict. 
Namibia treated the Angolan conflict as its own, for UNITA had been involved in the 
killings of several Namibians in the northern part of the country. The two ruling parties, 
the MPLA and SWAPO, had close historic ties. The state of affairs thus caused 
Windhoek to become actively involved in the conflict. As Prunier (2009:192) explains: 
UNITA infiltrations in the north [of Namibia] forced the Namibian Defence Force to 
integrate its operational plans with those of the FAA and to operate as far as north as 
Mavinga, five hundred kilometres into Angola, to protect its border. 
The above is authenticated by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) report of 17 
December 1999, in which the NDF Chief of Staff, Major-General Martin Shalli, is said to 
have acknowledged that Namibian forces had crossed the border into Angola, in 
support of the FAA (BBC, 1999). 
Apart from the physical participation in the war inside Angola, Namibia had also 
granted permission to the FAA to come into Namibia in pursuit of the UNITA rebels 
who, at the time, had retreated as far south as northern Namibia. The permission also 
included the launching of attacks against UNITA from Namibian soil (BBC, 1999; 
Grobbelaar et al., 2003; Prunier, 2009).  
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Boksenbaum (1999) explains Namibia’s military intervention in the Angolan conflict, 
stating:  
Namibia's unannounced involvement in the fighting should not have come as a surprise. 
On April 9 [1999] the southwest African country signed a mutual defence pact with Angola, 
the DRC and Zimbabwe. The pact, signed by defence ministers in Luanda, provides for 
mutual military support should any of the signatory countries face ‘internal or external 
aggression’. It outlined support for Kabila's war against rebels and the Angolan 
government's drawn-out battle with UNITA. 
Apart from integrating its troops with the FAA, allowing the FAA to enter Namibia in 
search of UNITA forces, and allowing the FAA to launch attacks on UNITA from 
Namibian soil, Namibia deployed the NDF at its borders with Angola in response to the 
destabilisation that was caused when UNITA forces started fleeing into northern 
Namibia (ISS, 2011). 
President Nujoma summarises as quoted in Dzinesa & Rupiya (2005:227) stating that 
“the Army launched hot pursuit operations that minimised UNITA atrocities in 
Namibia. In the process, these hot pursuit operations into Angola destroyed UNITA 
bases and many tons of war materiel were captured. The Army contributed greatly to 
the reduction of UNITA terrorists’ morale and subsequently their effectiveness, which 
resulted in their annihilation, and the elimination of Jonas Savimbi on 22 February 
2002.” 
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4.3 Conclusion  
As a Portuguese colony, Angola was administered as a province of Portugal. Before the 
formal declaration of Angola as a province of Portugal and, indeed, before the Berlin 
conference offered Angola as a Portuguese economic sphere of interest, the Portuguese 
had already established their presence in Angola as far back as the 1500s. The 
Portuguese exploitation of the Angolan natives caused a political awakening, leading to 
the formulation of social discourses on anti-colonial resistance. In 1961, the Angolan 
nationalist movements launched an armed anti-colonial resistance. While the anti-
colonial struggle was going on, a coup occurred in Lisbon, in 1974, which would usher 
in a new era in Angolan history, one of colonialism and anti-colonial resistance. The 
new regime that took over after independence was not interested in the continuity of 
the colonial project. As such, it agreed, together with the nationalist movements, that 11 
November 1975 would see the birth of Angola’s independence, which transpired as had 
been planned.   
Unfortunately, the nationalist movements could not forge a common perspective for the 
future of Angola. They thus started fighting one another in their attempts to capture 
state power, come 11 November 1975. Due to the political climate in international 
politics at the time, which was dominated by the Cold War, the Angolan conflict was to 
take on an international dimension. Cuba and the Soviet Union supported the MPLA, 
whereas the United States and apartheid South Africa supported UNITA, while Zaire 
supported the FNLA. Ferocious fighting surfaced as a result. The MPLA managed to 
win the first part of the war, especially that which was waged between 1974 and 1976. 
With the assistance of Cuba, the MPLA managed to seize control of Luanda, forming a 
new government on 11 November 1975.  
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UNITA and its allies reorganised, and, with the FNLA seemingly having been 
destroyed, new fighting arose. UNITA again took control of some provinces, 
specifically those in the rural parts of Angola. During this period, UNITA enjoyed the 
financial and military support of the United States and of apartheid South Africa. The 
latter actively took part in military offensives in Angola, for it had security interests in 
the area, since the ANC and SWAPO had bases within Angola. The ANC and SWAPO 
were fighting against the apartheid government in Namibia and South Africa at the 
time. In response, Cuba increased the number of her troops in Angola, thus taking on, 
with its allies, UNITA and its allies. When the international community realised that the 
war could not be concluded militarily, and especially with the end of the Cold War, 
peace processes to resolve the conflict were started.  
The first peace processes saw the withdrawal of the Cuban troops and the granting of 
independence to Namibia. The Bicesse Accord was finally signed by the MPLA. UNITA 
called for a ceasefire and set out the roadmap towards the September 1992 elections, 
supervised by the UN. The elections took place and the MPLA emerged victorious. 
Although the UN declared the elections to have been both free and fair, UNITA rejected 
the results, and went to war once more. This time, UNITA had to rely on the revenue 
raised from the sale of diamonds from the seized mines to finance its war, since its allies 
were no longer supporting it. The Lusaka peace talks resumed, culminating in the 
signing of the Lusaka Protocol. This protocol contained the provisions of the Bicesse 
Accord, as well as new provisions. UNITA flouted this agreement, and again went to 
war. This led to the MPLA suspending the peace talks, calling for the UN to withdraw, 
and directing the FAA to launch a full-scale attack on UNITA. This led to the 
assassination of UNITA’s leader, Jonas Savimbi, which was a decisive moment that saw 
the ushering of an era of real peace in Angola. 
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Namibia formed part of the various UN missions to Angola from 1996 to 1999, which 
was during the time of UNAVEM III and MONUA. Namibia also took part in various 
military operations in Angola. The operational plans of the NDF were integrated with 
those of the FAA in the fight against UNITA. Namibia allowed the FAA into Namibia to 
launch attacks against UNITA, and also to search for UNITA troops in Namibia. The 
NDF was also deployed at Namibia’s border to avoid the influx of UNITA into 
Namibia.  
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CHAPTER FIVE – COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
There are various similarities and differences in Namibia’s peacemaking role in the two 
conflicts under study. Indeed, similarities and differences exist in terms of the nature of 
these two SADC conflicts and the peacemaking role played by Namibia. Below follows 
a comparative analysis of the two case studies.  
5.1 Similarities  
Both conflicts have the same origin. They were all invoked by the abrupt granting of 
independence by the respective colonial masters. In January 1960, Belgians abruptly 
announced that they will grant independence to the DRC. The then Belgian colonial 
administration had not build a cohesive state nor did it invest in education to empower 
the natives to take over the governance of the state. As a result, the new state was soon 
characterized by instabilities which subsequently, after several coups, ended in a civil 
war. The same happened in Angola in 1974, when the coup occurred in Portugal with 
the new regime suddenly announcing that it will grant Independence to Angola on 11 
November 1975. Like in the DRC, the new Angolan state was characterized by 
instabilities which culminated into a civil war. 
In Angola and the DRC, the rebel forces fighting the government were backed by 
foreign nations. In the DRC, various rebel forces were supported by Rwanda and 
Uganda. In Angola, UNITA was supported by South Africa, DRC and United States. 
The two conflicts thus involved various countries. In Angola, the conflict involved 
Cuba, South Africa, United States, DRC and Namibia. The DRC conflict involved 
Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Chad and Sudan. Both 
conflicts corroborate Darby & Mac Ginty (2008) assertion, as stated in chapter 1, that 
contemporary peacemaking is often a creature of foreign nations. The UN was involved 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
          
 
86 
in the Angola Conflict through MONUA and various UNAVEM missions. In the DRC, 
the UN was also involved mainly through MONUC.  
Namibia played an active military role in both Angola and in the DRC. In the DRC, 
Namibia sent about 2 000 troops and 20 tons of military weapons and other supplies to 
aid the Kabila government. The NDF, and the SADC allied forces, secured Kinshasa and 
the airport. The NDF provided for the personal security for President Kabila and 
secured the DRC’s strategic link to the Atlantic Ocean. In Angola, the NDF was 
integrated with the FAA in pursuit of UNITA. Namibia allowed FAA to come into 
Namibia in search of UNITA rebels. While the NDF was deployed at Angola-Namibian 
border, the FAA was granted permission to launch attacks, on UNITA, from the 
Namibian soil. UNITA had retreated into northern Namibia thus causing instability in 
that part of Namibia.  
Namibia’s peacemaking role in both the DRC and Angola took a diplomatic path as 
well. Namibia was part of earlier diplomatic efforts by the SADC OPDS to resolve the 
DRC conflict. It participated in the peace talks that culminated in the signing, by 
Namibia and all parties involved in the conflict, of the Lusaka peace agreement. In 
Angola, Namibia took part in MONUA and various UNAVEM missions. Moreover, 
Namibian forces were also tasked with the responsibility of UN VIP escort and part of 
the UN Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). 
The involvement of Namibia in the DRC and Angola was conducted in a secretive 
manner. In both the DRC and the Angolan conflict, Namibia’s involvement was known 
by a few; politicians and officials publicly denied the country’s involvement in both the 
conflicts at the onset, despite it later becoming public knowledge with the passage of 
time.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
          
 
87 
When news spread and entered the public domain that Namibia had sent troops to the 
DRC, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Theo Ben Gurirab, publicly denied 
such an occurrence. Scandalously, President Nujoma confirmed that such had, in fact, 
been the case. It is said that many at the time had truly not been aware of the 
intervention (Amupadhi, 2004; Mushelenga, 2008).The Angolan conflict was similar to 
the above, in that, although it later became public knowledge that Namibia had, indeed, 
sent troops into Angola and had merged with the FAA in pursuit of UNITA, the NDF 
officials concerned, as had done the Foreign Minister during the DRC conflict, disputed 
the existence of such a state of affairs. When the then NDF spokesperson, Vincent 
Mwange, was approached by the media to comment on the matter, he ‘rubbished’ such 
a state of affairs as ‘baseless, ‘malicious’ and ‘void of any truth’ (Maletsky, 1999). 
Scandalously again, the Chief of Staff, Major-General Martin Shalli, was interviewed, 
and quoted by the BBC on 17 December 1999 as acknowledging the sending of 
Namibian troops into Angola (BBC, 1999; Boksenbaum, 1999; Prunier, 2009).  
The other similarity between the two cases is that Namibia’s intervention has been on 
the side of the government and not on the sides of the rebel forces. In the DRC, Namibia 
supported the government of President Kabila in fighting rebel forces supported by 
Rwanda and Uganda. In the Angolan conflict, Namibia was supporting the MPLA 
government in its fight against UNITA rebels. Namibia’s involvement in the two 
conflicts was part of the process that returned peace to the region. The timely 
withdrawal of Namibian troops enabled the peace negotiations to take place. As has 
been established before, in chapter 3, even the UN applauded Namibia for its timely 
withdrawal as a contributing factor to the peace negotiations. NDF/FAA successful 
onslaught and the subsequent killing of Jonas Savimbi enabled the return of peace in 
Angola. 
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5.2 Differences 
While there are various similarities between the two case studies, there are equally 
differences between the two cases. Below, therefore, follows an analysis of the 
differences between the case studies.  
The conflict in the DRC was preceded by various coups. The first coup was the one of 
Colonel Mobutu; he was overthrown, in yet another coup, by Laurent Kabila. On the 
other hand, no single coup preceded the Angolan conflict. The DRC conflict was solved 
with the assistance of outsiders to a larger extent. The DRC conflict was solved after 
protracted negotiations facilitated by SADC. The Angolan conflict was solved by the 
Angolans themselves, albeit with considerable assistance from Namibia, when the 
MPLA government managed to assassinate the UNITA rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi. 
Angola, to a large extent, only had one rebel formation, UNITA, while the DRC conflict 
had more than five rebel formations. 
During the Angolan conflict, the NDF was integrated with the FAA in its pursuit of 
UNITA rebels. This meant that the two forces operated, militarily, together as opposed 
to each doing its separate operations. This was not the case in the DRC where the NDF 
went with a specific mission, of not integration, but of securing Kinshasa to prevent the 
toppling of the Kabila government by the rebel forces and their allies, Uganda and 
Rwanda. 
Namibia was the first country to withdraw all her troops from the DRC. As discussed 
earlier by Lumb (1999), in chapter 3, President Nujoma was reported to have opted to 
withdraw his troops in support of the negotiated settlement of the conflict. This was not 
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possible with regards to the Angolan conflict for the NDF/FAA alliance remained intact 
until the killing of Savimbi in 2002.  
There was wide opposition to Namibia’s participation in the DRC conflict both 
domestically and internationally. The opposition political parties in the National 
Assembly went as far as suggesting that President Nujoma violated the constitution in 
singlehandedly sending troops to the DRC. This event caused confusion in the foreign 
policy making of Namibia. In SADC, there was no consensus between the then 
chairperson of SADC, President Nelson Mandela, and the then chairperson of the SADC 
OPDS, President Robert Mugabe. There was, however, little opposition, if any, on 
Namibia’s involvement in the Angolan conflict. At the level of SADC, Savimbi was 
defined a war criminal by the entire region (Dzinesa & Rupiya, 2005).  
The motives of Namibia’s involvement in the DRC was indicated by President Nujoma 
as an act of coming to aid a SADC member whose sovereignty was  violated by foreign 
aggressors. Scholars argued that there is a possibility that Namibia had self-interest 
economic motives, like other allied SADC states, for coming to aid the Kabila 
government. On the other hand, the motive of the Angolan conflict was regarded as 
that of national security for UNITA had destabilized northern Namibia, including 
killing a number of Namibians. Namibia’s peacemaking role in the DRC was regarded 
as the SADC initiative on the request of a fellow SADC member while the Angolan 
intervention was not, in any way, sanctioned by SADC but a situation of national 
security or a matter of bilateral relations between the two countries. In other words; 
although disputed, only the DRC intervention can be said to have taken place under the 
SADC banner.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
          
 
90 
While the UN was involved in both conflicts, there was a difference between the two 
conflicts. Namibia was part of the composition of the UN missions to Angola. The same 
did not happen with regards to the DRC UN missions. While Namibia participated 
militarily in both conflicts, she gave about 20 tons of military weapons and other 
supplies to the DRC government. The Kabila government, additionally, received a loan 
to the value of N$ 25 Million which was not yet repaid by 2008 (Mushelenga, 2008). 
There was no loan granted to Angola as was the case during the DRC conflict.   
The DRC conflict took place only in the DRC, not in Namibia. The Angolan conflict on 
the other hand took place in both Namibia and Angola. UNITA had entered Namibia 
thus destabilising the country and causing several deaths. In response, Namibia granted 
Angola permission to enter the country in search of UNITA rebels and to launch attack 
from inside Namibia. Namibia participated more in peace negotiation processes of the 
DRC conflict compared to that of Angola. Namibia was part of earlier efforts by the 
SADC OPDS to find peaceful solution to the DRC conflict. It signed the Lusaka peace 
agreement that charted the way for the negotiation processes that would bring about 
peace in the DRC with the signing of the Global All Inclusive agreement of 2002.  
5.3 Summary 
The DRC conflict, which involved about eight different African countries, destabilized 
the region, resulting in it becoming referred to by many as ‘Africa’s First World War’. 
Others refer to it as the most devastating war to have occurred since the Second World 
War, as about 6 million people died in the conflict. The Angolan conflict was also 
another devastating conflict that, too, caused regional instability, leading to more than 
700 000 thousand deaths. Both conflicts also led to a serious refugee situation in the 
region (Baregu, 2002; Cornwell & Potgieter, 1998; Hodges, 2001; Malaquias, 2007; 
Prunier, 2009). 
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During the two conflicts, extensive resources of nation states were allocated to warfare, 
instead of being channelled towards more productive and life-saving welfare and 
poverty alleviation programmes. For example, the UN estimates that the war in the 
DRC cost Namibia about N$ 700 Million (Dzinesa & Rupiya, 2005). Many people left 
their homes and families, fleeing war zones. Students had to drop out of school, and 
societies were uprooted by the fighting in these nation states. Namibia’s peacemaking 
role, as discussed earlier, must also be viewed from the perspective of having attained 
regional peace and stability and of also having returned war zones to normality. The 
intervention of Namibia and its allies in the DRC, which culminated in the stalemate 
leading to the peace process, must be viewed from that perspective too. Although not 
fully at peace, the restoration of peace and stability in the DRC cannot be compared to 
the past situation where the lost of innocent lives was the order of the day. Children 
could return to school, and normal societal activities could resume. Budgetary 
allocations could then be channelled towards sustaining the welfare of citizens rather 
than to warfare. Development could thus take place, while the number of the Congolese 
crossing the borders as refugees was minimized. The NDF and FAA onslaught of 
UNITA and the subsequent killing of Jonas Savimbi also meant that peace and stability 
had returned to the region. At the time of the current study, Angola was doing well 
economically, and was considered to be one of the largest and fastest growing 
economies in Africa.   
It is widely considered that there can be no development without peace. The end of the 
two major conflicts and the attaining of regional peace and stability meant that SADC, 
as a region, could actively engage in a collective development agenda that had not been 
possible in wartime. As such, in the 2000s, SADC launched a Free Trade Area (FTA) 
that was intended to bring about regional integration and to promote trade and 
investment in the region. The FTA aimed at removing tariffs on some products by 2008, 
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while the year 2012 was earmarked to realise full trade liberalisation, all of which would 
not have been possible under a prevailing situation of conflict and protracted war 
(Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002; SADC Trade, 2011). 
Namibian’s peacemaking, in cases considered, was twofold,  taking both diplomatic 
and military approaches. Such peacemaking can said to have originated during the 
country’s struggle for independence. During the struggle for independence, the ruling 
SWAPO party had engaged in similar endeavours. While it conducted an armed 
liberation struggle, it also engaged in such diplomatic activities as the petitioning of UN 
offices in various parts of the world, and maintained an observer status at the OAU 
(Katjavivi, 1988).  
Namibia was first involved in earlier diplomatic efforts, conducted by the SADC OPDS, 
to resolve the conflict in the DRC. It attended the first meeting, in Victoria Falls, where 
all the belligerents were brought together, and a committee was set up to consider the 
nature of the conflict and to propose recommendations to the OPDS. Namibia formed 
part of the committee. While such diplomatic engagements were taking place at the 
level of SADC, Namibia, together with Angola and Zimbabwe, sent troops to the DRC 
to defend the Kabila government. While its troops were in the DRC, the country 
continued to take part in SADC diplomatic engagements to resolve the conflict. Of 
particular importance is the fact that Namibia signed the Lusaka Peace Agreement 
which culminated in its withdrawal by 2000, it was the first country  to withdraw its 
troops from the DRC (Lumb, 1999; Meyns, 2002; Prunier, 2009). As such, Namibia’s 
peacemaking takes a twofold character. 
Namibia also engaged in twofold peacemaking during the Angolan conflict. At the 
beginning of the conflict, Namibia formed part of the UN missions to Angola, 
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participating in UNAVEM II, III and MONUA (MoD, 2011). The country was also 
actively involved in military activities in Angola, conducting joint operations with the 
FAA against UNITA, and allowing the FAA to enter Namibia in search of UNITA rebel 
forces and to use Namibia’s territory to launch attacks on UNITA. Namibia also 
deployed its NDF at the border, leading to several armed confrontations with UNITA 
(BBC, 1999; ISS, 2011; Prunier, 2009). 
In order to determine which of the cases was successful, one would need to establish 
what the objectives were. Going into the DRC, President Nujoma stated that Namibia 
was acting to aid a fellow SADC member whose sovereignty was violated by foreign 
aggressors with the aim of toppling that government.  Namibia, and the SADC allies, 
thus went to the DRC to aid President Kabila and prevent the overthrow of his 
government. In objectives vis-à-vis results analysis, it can be considered that the DRC 
case was successful for it met its objectives. Namibia and the SADC allies managed to 
prevent the overthrow the of the Kabila government. The objective in Angola was the 
ultimate defeat of UNITA considered to be a threat to Namibia’s national security. 
UNITA was defeated with the killing of its leader, Jonas Savimbi, in 2002. Again, in 
objectives vis-à-vis results analysis, it can be considered that the Angolan case was also 
successful.  
The question that follows then is which of the two, when compared, was more 
successful? Following this question, it will be prudent to consider which of the two 
genuinely contributed to peace. In pursuant to the answers to these questions, the 
current study arrived at a conclusion that Angola was the most successful. When the 
NDF withdrew its troops from the DRC, the conflict was not over. The fighting 
continued – the DRC remained ‘peace-less’. The ‘aggressors that violated the DRC’s 
sovereignty’ had not fully withdrawn from the DRC at the time Namibia withdrew her 
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troops. President Kabila was assassinated a few months after Namibia had withdrawn. 
When the NDF left Angola, the conflict had ended with the killing of Savimbi. Said 
differently, Angola, unlike the DRC, returned to peace with the killing of the UNITA 
leader. As President Nujoma consolidates; “the Army launched hot pursuit operations 
that minimised UNITA atrocities in Namibia. In the process, these hot pursuit 
operations into Angola destroyed UNITA bases and many tons of war materiel were 
captured. The Army contributed greatly to the reduction of UNITA terrorists’ morale 
and subsequently their effectiveness, which resulted in their annihilation, and the 
elimination of Jonas Savimbi on 22 February 2002” (Dzinesa & Rupiya: 2005, 227). The 
Angola peacemaking mission thus achieved peace in totality.  
 
The then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hidipo Hamutenya, in mid-2001, recognises the 
fact that Namibia’s withdrawal from the DRC, unlike in Angola, had not achieved 
peace in its totality. He was quoted stating that “with the Rwanda and Uganda 
aggression blunted and their hegemonic ambitions checked, it was now possible for 
other parties, such as the UN and South Africa, to step forth with proposals for 
peacekeeping and national reconciliation. The deployment of the UN Peacekeeping 
Forces is now being stepped up. Also, talks are going on between the government of the 
DRC and the various groups in that country in an effort to find a formula for the setting 
up of a transitional government of national reconciliation. These talks are taking place 
on the basis of the Pretoria Agreement, which is the latest attempt aimed at achieving 
national reconciliation in that country” (Dzinesa & Rupiya: 2005, 225).  
 
The Angolan conflict was more costly than the DRC. Prunier (2009) suggests that 
Namibia withdrew from the DRC conflict in order to concentrate on the Angolan war. 
The defeat of UNITA meant that lives of ordinary Namibians would no longer be lost 
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on UNITA’s making. It is for the above reason that this study concludes that Namibia’s 
peacemaking role in the Angola was more successful than that of the DRC.  
Additionally, another qualm with Namibia’s peacemaking role in the DRC is one that 
relates to the motives. Scholars question whether it can be genuinely be regarded as a 
contribution to peace. In other words, it is questionable whether Namibia’s 
peacemaking role in this country was a case of sheer altruism or it had concealed 
motives. 
 
Accounts of scholars discussed in this study (in chapter 3) make it difficult to declare 
Namibia’s peacemaking role in the DRC as free of ulterior motives. For example, the 
study of Orogun (2002:36–37) quotes President Nujoma stating that Namibian troops 
are in the DRC to “safeguard Namibia's future security... It is an honourable act of enlightened 
self-interests.” The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (1998), Iyenda (2002), 
Taylor and Williams (2001) and others points to how political and economic 
expediency, rather than sheer altruism, had played a role in driving Namibia to 
intervene in the DRC. In an interview with New Era Newspaper, 9 September 2011, 
Ambassador Tuliameni Kalomoh, the former Assistant UN Secretary-General, head of 
the Namibian Delegation to peace talks on the DRC in Lusaka (1998-1999), Deputy 
Foreign Affairs Minister (1996-1998) who is currently the Special Advisor on foreign 
Affairs to the office of the President, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
corroborated the above stating that: 
In those cases, like we have seen in Angola in the late 1990s and early 2000s that affected 
us directly on our northern and north-eastern borders, we were obliged to provide 
security assistance to Angola, to protect our own national interest, including the lives of 
Namibian people. When our strategic interest was involved in the Congo, when Congo 
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was invaded by neighboring countries, Rwanda and Uganda, and Congo requested 
assistance from friendly countries, Namibia responded positively. 
(New Era, 2011) 
Strikingly, Dzinesa & Rupiya (2005, 226) summarises:  
Namibia, however, aimed to build on its military involvement to strengthen bilateral 
relations with the DRC for mutual economic and social benefit. Remarkably, the 
assassinated DRC President Laurent Kabila reportedly offered diamond concessions to 
Namibia as payment for military assistance. A mine—consisting of two blocks of about 
25 km² along the Kasai River, 40 km from Tshikapa—was granted as a five-year 
concession. A feasibility study on the mine recommended negotiations with the DRC 
government, but the continued tenuous security situation and peace negotiations meant 
that by 2002 no prospecting had begun. The gift was then converted to a five-year 
business transaction, at no cost, and exploration activities were embarked upon by the 
Namibian company 26 August. SWAPO has established a company with this name in 
recognition of the first attack mounted in the war in South West Africa during the 1970s. 
 
The current study, therefore, concludes that Namibia’s peacemaking role in the DRC, 
clouded with the above economic and political expediency, and did not genuinely 
contribute to peace in the DRC. Its peacemaking role, accompanied with economic 
motives, was a contribution to successful peace processes to follow in the future. This 
was acknowledged by the then former Minister of Foreign Affairs, as quoted earlier that 
Namibia’s intervention allowed South Africa and others to move in with peacekeeping 
proposals. It is on that basis, as is of other discussed earlier, that Namibia’s 
peacemaking role in Angola was not only successful but also genuinely contributed to 
peace, unlike in the DRC.  
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION  
6.1 Introduction 
The current study, which offers a comparative analysis of Namibia’s peacemaking role 
in the SADC region, with regards to the case of the DRC and Angola, has taken the form 
of what is known as qualitative research. The ‘desktop’ research that it entailed was 
based on both primary and secondary data. This method of research was preferred, 
because it was not possible to conduct, for example, interviews, due to limitations of 
both time and resources. The contribution of this study stems from the existing 
literature that was available on the subject in the field. The study made use of books, 
academic journals, newspaper articles and reports, pictures, internet articles, official 
documents and statements, speeches, legislations, constitutions, and working papers. 
The methodology used was successful, especially considering that there was little 
scholarly work already existing on the subject (Namibia’s peacemaking). The researcher 
found that engaging with the various kinds and forms of sources used was not only 
stimulating, but also largely interesting, for finding solutions to problems encountered 
brought great joy and inspiration. The study anticipated that having to deal with 
sources in another language could have been a barrier to the successful progress of the 
study, but fortunately that did not prove to be the case.  
To present a comparative analysis of Namibia’s peacemaking role in SADC, the study 
was organized into six chapters. Chapter 1 presented the methodology of the study, 
indicating what was studied, as well as how and why. The chapter provided that the 
study would take the form of qualitative research, based on primary and secondary 
data.  
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Chapter 2 concerned the conceptual and theoretical framework of the study. Various 
concepts, in peacemaking scholarship, were discussed to orientate the reader with 
wider literature to which the study belongs. The discussion on peacemaking 
internationally focused on the nature of peacemaking and the institutions safeguarding 
peacemaking at that level. The UN was identified as that organization with 
responsibility of ensuring world peace. Its failures and successes were discussed as 
done by other scholars. To link to the study, a brief look at the work of this body on 
countries selected as case studied was provided. The chapter looked at peacemaking in 
Africa with specific focus on the AU and its security structure, the PSC. SADC security 
structure was also discussed in this chapter.  It was done to assess how effective is 
SADC peacemaking. The chapter hosted critiques of traditional and indigenous 
peacemaking and the responsibility to protect concept. Moreover, the chapter looked at 
gender and the exclusion of women in peacemaking.  
Chapter 3 was dedicated to the DRC conflict. It was important to discuss the origin of 
the conflict first, in order to clarify Namibia’s peacemaking role in the conflict. In 
discussing the conflict, in consideration to the history of the DRC, it was found that the 
problems experienced in the DRC had come a long way, for the country did not enjoy 
peace from since the DRC was proclaimed a personal colony of King Leopold II until 
the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement was concluded on 17 December 
2002. Namibia intervened in the DRC conflict in 1998 together with Angola and 
Zimbabwe. It managed to prevent the overthrow of Kabila’s government and secured 
Kinshasa that had been about to be captured, at the time, by the rebels. There is a large 
body of literature that indicates that there was large-scale plundering of the natural 
resources from the DRC by Namibia and her allies and the allies of the opposing rebels. 
The chapter outlined the peacemaking role played by Namibia in this conflict, and then 
in the peace process towards the resolution of this particular conflict.   
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Chapter 4 focussed on the Angolan conflict, its origin and its processes. Angola, like the 
DRC, had known very little of peace. This is said whether one views peace as the 
absence of war or beyond the absence of war, between 1975 and 2002 (Galtung, 1969). 
The chapter discussed the historicity of the Angolan conflict and, importantly, provided 
insights into the peacemaking role of Namibia at both the diplomatic (UN) and the 
military level in that conflict. The chapter then followed the conflict until the 
assassination of UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, which has opened a new chapter for 
peace in Angola since 1975. 
Chapter 5 carried out a comparative analysis of the case studies. There were various 
similarities and differences found and exposed in that chapter. The chapter indicated 
the important role played by Namibia and its contribution to the return of peace and 
stability in the region. The chapter analyzed Namibia’s peacemaking role as regards to 
the two cases and found that Namibia’s peacemaking takes place at both diplomatic 
and military front. It was also found that Namibia’s peacemaking, in cases considered, 
was carried out in a clandestine manner.  Namibia’s peacemaking role in Angola was 
found more successful and a genuine contribution to peace compared to the DRC. 
The current chapter, Chapter 6, concludes the study. It begins with a recollection of 
arguments presented in previous chapters before presenting the results of Namibia’s 
peacemaking role in the DRC and Angola. This section will then be followed by a final 
conclusion of the study.  
6.2 Results of Namibia’s Peacemaking in the DRC and Angola 
This study finds that Namibia was an active participant in regional peacemaking. Out 
of 15 SADC member states, only three countries came to aid Kabila’s government in 
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response to a call he made to SADC, pleading for assistance with fighting against the 
rebels supported by Uganda and Rwanda. Namibia was one of the three countries. As 
an active participant in regional peacemaking, Namibia was the only country that gave 
permission to the FAA to use its territory to search for, and to launch attacks on UNITA 
rebels during the Angolan conflict. The two cases, therefore, indicate that Namibia is, 
indeed, an active participant in regional peacemaking. It is important to note, as the 
current study has explained, that being an active participant in peacemaking is not 
synonymous to genuine contribution to peace.  
Namibia managed to attain its key objectives in the DRC conflict which was preventing 
the fall of Kabila’s government. There is wider consensus that, had it not been for the 
intervention of Namibia and SADC allies, the Kabila government could have been 
toppled by the rebels. However, the NDF managed to secure the capital, Kinshasa, and 
the western economic corridor, which was the strategic link to the Atlantic ocean 
(Cornwell & Potgieter, 1998; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 1998; Lumb, 
1999; Orogun, 2002). The DRC conflict also caused major rifts within SADC, which 
Namibia’s President, Sam Nujoma, was instrumental in reconciling until the regional 
block unanimously agreed to support the intervention. Namibia also played a role in 
the early efforts made to obtain a peaceful settlement of the conflict prior to the 
intervention (Cornwell & Potgieter, 1998; Lumb, 1999; Meyns, 2002; Punungwe, 1999; 
SADC, 1998). 
As a result of its intervention in the DRC conflict, Namibia secured itself a Mutual 
Defence Pact, which was signed in Luanda on 9 April 1999 with Zimbabwe and Angola. 
The pact provides for military support should any of the signatory states face internal 
or external aggression. SADC also followed the allies with its own Mutual Defence Pact 
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that was signed, four years later, by the member states on 26 August 2003 in Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania (Boksenbaum, 1999; IRIN News, 1999; Melber, 2011; SADC, 2003).  
In the arena of domestic politics, the clandestine involvement of Namibia in the DRC 
and Angolan conflict has opened up serious questions regarding who has the power to 
send troops beyond the Namibian borders to partake in foreign wars. Specifically, the 
DRC conflict gave rise to serious debates in Namibia. Some, especially lawmakers in the 
National Assembly, felt that Parliament should be consulted in such matters and that 
President Nujoma acted single-handedly in sending troops to the DRC (this debate was 
discussed at length in Chapter 3). However, on close inspection, it was found that no 
legislation compelled the President to consult Parliament, or anyone else for that matter, 
in acting as commander-in-chief of the NDF in deploying troops outside the country. 
Whereas the Constitution, in Article 27, requires the President to consult Parliament in 
declaring a threat to national defence and security, a public emergency or a state of 
national defence and martial law, the Constitution contains no provision that requires 
the President to consult the legislature when deploying the NDF on foreign soil (Lumb, 
1999; Mushelenga, 2008).  
The silence of the Constitution on the subject is what the current study refers to as the 
‘grey area’ in legislation. The researcher, upon discovering such a grey area, 
investigated as to what had been done about it. The result of the investigation is 
regarded as emerging from ‘grey area’ to lucid legislation. As a clear result of the 
furious debates surrounding the DRC conflict, the National Assembly committed to 
putting an end to the ‘grey area’ by passing the Defence Act No. 1 of 2002 (dated 7 June 
2002). The legislation provides clear guidelines as to how the members of the NDF are 
to be deployed on foreign soil and who has the power to direct such deployment. There 
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is, thus, a need to quote the relevant legislation, consisting of section 32 (Service outside 
Namibia), at length, as follows: 
(2) The President may, with the concurrence of the Cabinet, deploy members of the Defence 
Force outside Namibia-(a) in compliance with a resolution of the Security Council of the 
United Nations or the African Union or the Southern African Development Community; or 
(b) in the execution of an obligation arising from a bilateral or multilateral agreement to 
which Namibia is a party, for the purpose of maintaining, bringing about or restoring peace, 
security and stability in a country other than Namibia. (3) The President must as soon as 
possible, but not later than 30 days after a deployment was ordered under subsection (2), 
inform the National Assembly of the deployment. 
(4) If a deployment contemplated in subsection (2) is ordered at a time when the National 
Assembly is not in session, the President must forthwith summon the National Assembly to 
meet as soon as possible, but not later than 30 days after the deployment was ordered. (5) 
Upon being informed in terms of subsection (3) of a deployment referred to in that 
subsection, the National Assembly may by resolution, proposed by at least one third of all 
the members of the National Assembly and passed by a two-thirds majority of all the 
members of the National Assembly, disapprove of the President's decision to deploy 
members of the Defence Force. (6) In the event of a disapproval under subsection (5), the 
President is obliged to withdraw the members of the Defence Force not later than 30 days 
from the date of such disapproval. 
(Defence Act, 2002) 
One of the main achievements of Namibia, in the Angolan conflict, was attaining the 
national goal of security, for UNITA had not only terrorised and destabilised northern 
Namibia, but the belligerent had also been responsible for several attacks in the 
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northern part of the country, which had involved killing numerous Namibians (Prunier, 
2009). The killing of UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, in February 2002, meant the return 
of stability to the northern part of Namibia and the stoppage of frequent attacks and 
killings. The military role in the Angolan conflict was profound. The NDF joined forces 
with the FAA in its pursuit of UNITA, operating as far north as northern Angola. The 
NDF was also deployed at the Namibian border with Angola in causing various UNITA 
casualties and in restoring stability to the land. Namibia also granted permission to the 
FAA to enter the country in search of UNITA rebels and also to launch attacks on 
UNITA from Namibian soil. Namibia also formed part of various UN missions, such as 
UNAVEM III, RRF and MONUA, to Angola (BBC, 1999: Boksenbaum, 1999: Grobbelaar 
et al., 2003; ISS, 2011; MoD, 2000: Ndaitwah, 2010). 
6.3 Conclusion  
The rationale of the current study, as established at the onset, was to ensure that a 
comparative analysis of Namibia’s peacemaking role in the SADC region exists. The 
study, from the onset, found the fact that very few studies existed on the subject matter 
problematical. The rationale was, therefore, to fill the gap in the literature. The primary 
aim of the study was to provide a comparative analysis of Namibia’s peacemaking role 
in the SADC region with reference to the DRC and the Angolan conflict respectively. 
The secondary aim of the study is to provide a descriptive account of Namibia’s 
peacemaking role in the selected cases. The study was to determine the similarities and 
differences between the two cases. Furthermore, the study was to determine which of 
the two cases yielded more successes and why.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
          
 
104 
 Consequently, the study provided a comparative analysis of Namibia’s peacemaking in 
the SADC region. It found that Namibia is an active participant in peacemaking in the 
SADC region, taking a twofold approach in its peacemaking.  
There are various similarities and differences between the two cases. The conflicts in the 
two cases trace their origins from abrupt granting of independence. The UN was 
involved in both conflicts. Namibia’s participation, in both conflicts, was in support of 
the governments, not rebel formations. All Namibia’s peacemaking in the cases 
concerned where conducted in a clandestine manner. Although all case studies were in 
terms of objectives vis-à-vis results, Angola was more successful than the DRC. 
Angolan conflict presented more serious national security threats to Namibia compared 
to the DRC. Namibia withdrew from the DRC before the end of the conflict. President 
Kabila, whose government Namibia went to protect, was assassinated in the process. 
The NDF stayed in Angola until the defeat of UNITA marked by the assassination of its 
leader, Jonas Savimbi in February 2002. Political and economic expediency informed 
Namibia’s peacemaking role in the DRC. This is to say that Namibia had ulterior 
motives than sheer altruism, for its involvement in the DRC. The study thus considers 
its involvement in the DRC as not a genuine contribution to peace in that country 
compared to the case of Angola.  
Consequent to its involvement in the DRC, Namibia managed to score itself military 
allies with the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact, in April 1999, with Angola and 
Zimbabwe, which also saw the whole of SADC signing a Mutual Defence Pact in 
August 2003. Much can be said about Namibia’s peacemaking profile and efforts in the 
SADC region. Namibia has conducted peacemaking in a secretive manner, as was 
shown in the case of Angola and the DRC. Seemingly, in the cases studied, only the top 
military executives and politicians were aware of the decisions taken to go to war in a 
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foreign country. Namibian peacemaking can be seen to take on the form of a twofold 
peacemaking, for it engages in both diplomatic and military efforts. The Namibian 
legislature has learned a lesson from the silence of its constitution on who has the 
power to send the NDF to war on foreign territory. It thus passed legislation (i.e. 
Defence Act No. 1 of 2002) that provides clarity on how peacemaking is to be conducted 
in future. 
Namibia’s participation in the two conflicts was, indeed, important, for it led to events 
that brought about peace in the respective countries, and thus peace and stability in the 
region in general. The conflicts concerned had destabilised the region, not only in terms 
of warfare but also in terms of the results of war, such as by causing refugee-related 
problems. As a result, collective regional development could not take place. The ending 
of conflict in the region is, thus, commendable and the participants in that process, 
including Namibia, are to be commended.  
The current study was not about predicting the future, but about providing a 
comparative analysis (primarily) and descriptive account (secondarily) of Namibia’s 
peacemaking role in the SADC region. The study is, therefore, presented as the basis for 
future studies, including those studies that are concerned with possible future 
predictions and pronouncements of Namibia’s pattern not only of peacemaking, but 
also of war and peace.  
In terms of occurrences in which researchers express an interest regarding their 
understanding of Namibia’s peacemaking role in the SADC region, the current 
comparative analysis should prove helpful in facilitating the gaining of such an 
understanding, as part of other research conducted into the subject 
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Appendix I 
Appendix I shows the Namibian soldiers forming part of the SADC Brigade. The SADC 
Brigade is a SADC standby force established to participate in missions as articulated in 
Article 13 of the Protocol Establishing the AU Peace and Security Council (MoD, 2011). 
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Appendix II 
Appendix II shows Namibian soldiers receiving accolades on UN peacekeeping missions 
(MoD, 2011).  
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Appendix III 
Appendix III shows Namibian soldiers returning from a UN peacekeeping mission (MoD, 
2011).  
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